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INTRODUCTION

O

NE of the most hotly debated questions under the common
law is under what circumstances an individual has a duty to
disclose relevant information unknown to the person with whom
she bargains. Dozens of law review articles and treatises and over
one thousand cases explore this vexing question of when and what
a contracting party must disclose to her counterparty, even in the
absence of explicit misleading statements. Although one frequently
encounters statements that, absent a fiduciary or confidential relationship, an individual need never disclose all that she knows to her
bargaining partner, this is best understood as mere rhetoric by
courts, rather than an accurate statement of law.1 Even a cursory

1

See, e.g., 3 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 608 (1960) (“Statements
are exceedingly common, both in texts and in court opinions, that relief will not be
given on the ground of mistake unless the mistake is ‘mutual.’ Such a broad generalization is misleading and untrue.”); Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. Legal Stud. 1, 6 (1978) (“In the past, it was often asserted that, absent fraud or misrepresentation, a unilateral mistake never
justifies excusing the mistaken party from his duty to perform or pay damages. This is
certainly no longer the law, and Corbin has demonstrated that in all probability it
never was.”); see also Heritage Ins. Co. of Am. v. First Nat’l Bank of Cicero, 629 F.
Supp. 1412, 1415 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (“[N]o duty of disclosure exists absent a fiduciary
duty or public trust between parties to a transaction.”); French v. Vining, 102 Mass.
132, 135 (1869) (“It is sometimes rather loosely said that mere silence, on the part of
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examination of the cases reveals, instead, that courts require full
disclosure in some circumstances, but not in others.
Determining what circumstances will lead courts to intervene to
correct disparities in knowledge between bargaining parties, however, has proved problematic. Courts repeatedly reach divergent
results in similar, or even seemingly identical, cases and have failed
to articulate a coherent or generally accepted rule as to when they
will impose a duty of candor on contracting parties.
As a result, numerous legal commentators have analyzed the law
of fraudulent silence (also referred to as actionable nondisclosure
or actionable silence) in an attempt to identify some guiding principle that will rationalize the cases and generate accurate predictions of how courts will rule. Although some commentators point
to various specific factors (for example, whether the withheld information related to a latent defect or whether the litigating parties
were in a confidential or fiduciary relationship) that courts consider either alone or in some combination, others conclude that
courts provide no useful rule of law.2 Still other legal scholars, most
notably Professors Anthony Kronman and Kim Lane Scheppele,
reject the notion that narrow doctrinal rules motivate fraudulent
silence decisions and instead advance meta-theories3 (based, rethe vendor, as to a known defect, does not amount to a fraud. But this is far from being universally true.”).
2
See George Spencer Bower, The Law Relating to Actionable Nondisclosure and
Other Breaches of Duty in Relations of Confidence and Influence, at vi (1915) (arguing that the law of actionable nondisclosure cannot be “fit . . . into the rigid framework of a code”), quoted in Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal Secrets: Equality and Efficiency in the Common Law 112 (1988); Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Deceit, 1790–
1860: Continuity Amidst Change, 39 Am. J. Legal Hist. 405, 407 (1995) [hereinafter
Dalley, Law of Deceit] (discussing the law of fraud, including the law of fraudulent
silence, and noting that “there does not seem to be any factor which accurately predicts which policy a particular court will find determinative in a particular case, other
than the merits of the case”); Deborah A. DeMott, Do You Have the Right to Remain Silent?: Duties of Disclosure in Business Transactions, 19 Del. J. Corp. L. 65, 66
(1994) (“My thesis is that legal doctrine does not resolve these scenarios in a symmetrical fashion.”).
3
We use the terms “theories” and “meta-theories” somewhat loosely. Some have
suggested to us that, technically speaking, the field lacks a comprehensive theory to
explain fraudulent silence case outcomes. Furthermore, they argue, the explanations
posited by commentators such as Professors Kronman and Scheppele should be
viewed as half descriptive and half normative. For these reasons, they argue, we
should not take them seriously as theories that generate testable predictions. While
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spectively, on whether courts seek primarily to further economic
efficiency or fairness) in an attempt to untangle the cases and illuminate the law of fraudulent silence.4
These meta-theories—along with the famous United States Supreme Court case of Laidlaw v. Organ5—inspired this project. In
Laidlaw, Organ had been bargaining over the price of 111 hogsheads of tobacco with Laidlaw’s agent, Girault, on the evening of
February 18, 1815, but did not reach an agreement on price before
departing. During the night, three gentlemen who had been with
the British fleet came ashore with news that the Treaty of Ghent
had been signed, ending the war of 1812 and lifting the blockade of
the port of New Orleans. One of these men was the brother of Organ’s business partner (who had a one-third interest in the profits
of the tobacco) and informed Organ of the news during the night.
Although the news of the war’s end was to be published in a
handbill early the next morning, Organ returned to Girault before

we somewhat agree with this characterization of the explanations (one of us more
than the other), in fact many take these explanations seriously. See, e.g., Richard
Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation: A Survey, 40 San Diego L. Rev.
1135, 1165–66 n.38 (2003) (citing Professors Kronman and Scheppele as providing different theories regarding information disclosure); William Hubbard, Communicating
Entitlements: Property and the Internet, 22 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 401, 416 n.89 (2004)
(citing the work of Professors Scheppele and Kronman to support the claim that
scholars disagree about the optimal level of disclosure). For those readers who believe
we are using the term “meta-theories” too loosely, we suggest viewing this study as
the first systematic test of the conventional wisdom that flows from the commentators’ claims. Given our reading of the claims made by Professors Kronman, Scheppele, and others, however, we characterize the explanations as (albeit imperfect)
“meta-theories” in the sense that they posit frameworks designed to organize the
“data” produced by the court.
4
See, e.g., Scheppele, supra note 2, at 119–24 (advocating an equality of access approach to explain the law of actionable nondisclosure); Kim Lane Scheppele, “It’s
Just Not Right”: The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 123, 125
(1993) (same); Kronman, supra note 1, at 13–15 (arguing that the law of actionable
nondisclosure is best explained by the law’s desire to reward those who have expended time and effort to acquire the undisclosed information); Alan Strudler, Moral
Complexity in the Law of Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 337, 338–39 (1997) (arguing that the law of actionable nondisclosure as applied to buyers is best explained
through a deontological philosophy); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle
in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 375, 408–09 (1999) (justifying insider
trading regulation on a deontological theory of “equitable disclosure”).
5
15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
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its release and purchased the tobacco without disclosing the news.6
A few hours later, the news was released and the price of tobacco
rose significantly.
Chief Justice Marshall ruled that Organ had no duty to disclose
his knowledge of the end of the war to Girault.7 Due to the brevity
of Marshall’s opinion, however, commentators have struggled to
identify the principle underlying the decision. In the process, several theories have emerged that purport to explain not only the
Court’s decision in Laidlaw, but also the large and seemingly inconsistent body of other fraudulent silence cases.
Unfortunately, many authors in the field of fraudulent silence
discuss a limited number of cases that they believe support their asserted theories, without providing evidence that the chosen cases
are representative and without distinguishing cases that do not
support their theory.8 This Article represents the first attempt to
study empirically the factors that cause courts to impose disclosure
duties on bargaining parties in some circumstances, but not in others.9 We analyze data coded from 466 decisions spanning a wide array of jurisdictions and covering over two hundred years.
The results are mixed. In some instances our data support the
conventional wisdom relating to common-law disclosure duties.
For example, we find that courts are more likely to require the disclosure of latent, as opposed to patent, defects and are more likely
to require disclosure when the parties are in a fiduciary or confidential relationship.
In other instances, our results cast doubt on much of the conventional wisdom regarding the law of fraudulent silence. First, al6
Id. at 179, 182–83. Apparently, Girault asked Organ “if there was any news which
was calculated to enhance the price or value of the article about to be purchased.” Id.
at 183. The lower court determined that there was no evidence that Organ’s reply
“suggested any thing to the said Girault, calculated to impose upon him with respect
to said news,” and directed the jury to find for Organ. Id. at 183–84.
7
Id. at 195. Marshall did, however, remand to the lower court for a jury determination regarding Organ’s response to Girault’s inquiry. Id.
8
See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 31–32
(2002) (criticizing the methodology of much legal empirical research).
9
One prior attempt to study the cases systematically is Dalley, Law of Deceit, supra
note 2. Although Professor Dalley’s study is not a statistical analysis of the cases, her
article is an important contribution to the literature and her findings are discussed
throughout this Article.

2ND SUB_KRAWIECZEILERBOOK.DOC

1800

11/17/2005 10:32:28 AM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 91:1795

though it is generally understood that courts have become more
likely to impose disclosure duties over time, we find that courts actually have become less likely over time to impose duties to disclose. Second, and perhaps most importantly, we find that courts
are no more likely to impose disclosure duties when the information is casually acquired as opposed to deliberately acquired, and
that unequal access to information by the contracting parties is not
a significant factor that drives courts to find a duty to disclose. We
do find, however, that when both factors are present courts are significantly more likely to force disclosure.
I. COLLECTION OF HYPOTHESES AND CONSTRUCTED
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
We examined twenty independent variables and their relationships to courts’ decisions to impose a duty to disclose in fraudulent
silence cases. We grouped the variables into five general classes:
the type of information that was undisclosed, the type of transaction in which the parties were engaged, how the undisclosed information was acquired, the characteristics of the uninformed party,
and the behavior of the informed party. We also analyzed the case
decision year and the geographic region and jurisdiction of the
court deciding the case.
A. The Type of Information
Commentators frequently assert that the imposition of disclosure duties depends on the type of information in question. In particular, they claim that courts are more likely to find that an informed party owes to the uninformed party a duty to disclose when
the information is intrinsic in nature, relates to personal intentions
or opinions, relates to latent defects, concerns a defect likely to
cause bodily injury or property damage, or would have updated or
corrected previously disclosed information.
1. The Information Was Intrinsic, as Opposed to Extrinsic or
Market, Information
Some commentators argue that courts distinguish between intrinsic facts, which relate directly to the subject matter of the trans-
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action, and extrinsic facts, which relate to the market conditions or
environment affecting the subject matter of the transaction, and
only require the disclosure of intrinsic facts.10 Joseph Story explains
the distinction as follows:
Intrinsic circumstances are properly those which belong to the
nature, character, condition, title, safety, use, or enjoyment, &c.,
of the subject-matter of the contract, such as natural or artificial
defects in the subject-matter. Extrinsic circumstances are properly those which are accidentally connected with it, or rather
bear upon it at the time of the contract, and may enhance or diminish its value or price, or operate as a motive to make or decline the contract; such as facts respecting the occurrence of
peace or war, the rise or fall of markets, the character of the
neighborhood, the increase or diminution of duties, or the like
11
circumstances.

To illustrate, in the previously discussed case of Laidlaw v. Organ, Chief Justice Marshall ruled that “the intelligence of extrinsic
circumstances, which might influence the price of the commodity,
and which was exclusively within the knowledge of the vendee,”
need not be disclosed to the vendor.12 In Laidlaw, the information
concerning the end of the War of 1812 and the consequent lifting
of the blockade of the port of New Orleans was extrinsic information because it did not pertain to conditions solely affecting the tobacco exchanged between Organ and Laidlaw, but instead pertained to conditions affecting the market for and price of all
tobacco being shipped from New Orleans. Accordingly, it could be

10
See 2 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 377 (Legal Classics Library
1986) (1827) (“There may be some difference in the facility with which the rule [of
disclosure] applies between facts and circumstances that are intrinsic, and form material ingredients of the contract, and those that are extrinsic, and form no component
part of it, though they create inducements to enter into the contract, or affect the
price of the article.”); R.J. Pothier, Treatise on the Contract of Sale, ¶ 242, at 147–48
(L.S. Cushing trans., Legal Classics Library 1988) (1839) (“[T]here is no doubt,
that . . . a buyer is not entitled to complain, that the seller has not informed him of circumstances extrinsic to the thing sold, however much he may be interested in knowing them.”); 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence § 300, at 301–02
(W. H. Lyon, Jr. ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 14th ed. 1918) (1834).
11
1 Story, supra note 10, § 300, at 301–02 (footnote omitted).
12
Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 195 (emphasis added).
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argued that Chief Justice Marshall permitted nondisclosure in that
case because the undisclosed information was an extrinsic fact. If it
had been an intrinsic fact, according to this theory, disclosure
would have been required.
Other commentators, however, argue that the intrinsic/extrinsic
distinction provides, at best, only a partial explanation. Although
disclosure has been required more often with respect to intrinsic,
rather than extrinsic, facts, the better explanation for such rulings,
argue some scholars, is that intrinsic facts may not be readily discoverable by the uninformed party, whereas extrinsic facts are,13 or
that extrinsic facts are normally the result of a deliberate search,
whereas intrinsic facts are often casually acquired.14 In addition,
scholars argue that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction cannot adequately explain the results in all of the cases, particularly those
where the uninformed party is the purchaser, as opposed to the
seller.15 Finally, some observers argue that the intrinsic/extrinsic
distinction has been replaced in modern jurisprudence with other
theories of disclosure duties and is no longer relevant to court decisions concerning the degree of candor required of contracting parties.16 We thus predicted that in earlier years courts would be more
likely to rule that a duty to disclose existed in cases involving intrinsic information, but that this effect would narrow in significance
over time and finally disappear altogether.
2. The Undisclosed Information Concerned Personal Intentions or
Opinions
Although the distinction between opinion and fact is not always
clear, commentators seem to agree that failure to disclose personal
opinions or intentions is not actionable.17 This rule is sometimes re13

See Scheppele, supra note 2, at 128–29; W. Page Keeton, Fraud—Concealment
and Non-Disclosure, 15 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1936).
14
See Kronman, supra note 1, at 17–18 (arguing that market information is typically,
though not always, acquired through deliberate search).
15
See Keeton, supra note 13, at 21.
16
See Scheppele, supra note 2, at 128–29.
17
See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860, at
263 (1977) (stating that misstatements of opinion were not actionable at common law,
the rationale being to prevent judicial incursion into the private bargaining process);
see also Dalley, Law of Deceit, supra note 2, at 409 (listing reasons for the rule that
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ferred to as a distinction between personal and general information, or between individual and common facts.18 Gulian Verplanck
illustrates the distinction as follows: A director of a large insurance
company believes, from his observations and knowledge of the insurance industry and his own institution, that the insurance business is “overdone” and that current premiums are an inadequate
compensation for the risks assumed by insurers.19 If he sells his insurance stock to a purchaser with less knowledge of the industry
than he, the director is under no duty to disclose his opinion (with
which other informed parties might reasonably disagree) that the
stock is overpriced.20 If, on the other hand, the undisclosed information concerns losses in the insurance company that have depleted half its capital (a verifiable fact), disclosure would be required.21

statements of opinion are not actionable, including difficulties of proof and the fact
that such statements were too common to be reasonably relied on), 418–19 (arguing
that statements of intention are not actionable). A long-standing exception to this rule
exists: Under the doctrine of promissory fraud, a party commits fraud by entering into
a contract without disclosing that she lacks a present intention to perform on the contract. See, e.g., Lazar v. Superior Court, 909 P.2d 981, 985 (Cal. 1996) (“‘Promissory
fraud’ is a subspecies of the action for fraud and deceit. A promise to do something
necessarily implies the intention to perform; hence, where a promise is made without
such intention, there is an implied misrepresentation of fact that may be actionable
fraud.”); Paiva v. Vanech Heights Constr. Co., 271 A.2d 69, 71 (Conn. 1970) (“Although the general rule is that a misrepresentation must relate to an existing or past
fact, there are exceptions to this rule, one of which is that a promise to do an act in the
future, when coupled with a present intent not to fulfil [sic] the promise, is a false representation.”); Beers v. Atlas Assurance Co., 253 N.W. 584, 587 (Wis. 1934) (“While
there is a division of opinion, the weight of authority sustains a broader rule to the
effect that fraud may be predicated upon a promise made with a present intention not
to perform the same.”).
18
See, e.g., Gulian C. Verplanck, An Essay on the Doctrine of Contracts: Being An
Inquiry How Contracts Are Affected in Law and Morals by Concealment, Error, or
Inadequate Price 119–20 (Arno Press 1972) (1825) (distinguishing individual and
common facts); Paula J. Dalley, From Horse Trading to Insider Trading: The Historical Antecedents of the Insider Trading Debate, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1289, 1327–
29 (1998) [hereinafter Dalley, Insider Trading] (distinguishing general and personal
information).
19
Verplanck, supra note 18, at 121.
20
Id. at 121–22.
21
Id. at 122. Verplanck’s hypothetical also could be explained on the grounds that
courts distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic facts, or that the parties lack equal
access to information regarding the lost capital, whereas information regarding the
general state of the insurance industry is theoretically available to everyone. Similarly,
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Although we predicted that courts are less likely to find that the
informed party owed the uninformed party a duty to disclose when
the withheld information related to a personal opinion or intention, we also predicted that such cases were relatively rare, given
the widespread agreement among commentators that such information is not required to be disclosed. In addition, as regards allegations of a failure to disclose personal opinions, there is a second
reason to predict that these sorts of cases are rare. Because most
opinions are founded on underlying facts, we predicted that wellpleaded suits generally allege fraudulent nondisclosure of these
facts, rather than of the opinion itself. In other words, because
plaintiffs (or, more accurately, their counsel) should plead those
claims that have some chance of success, we predicted that relatively few cases alleging a failure to disclose a personal opinion
would be present in our dataset. Instead, plaintiffs intent on increasing their chances of success should plead a failure to disclose
the underlying facts on which the opinion was based.
3. The Undisclosed Information Related to a Latent Defect
One of the most common theories employed by commentators
to explain the results in nondisclosure cases concerns the difference
between latent and patent defects. As with so many of our variables, commentators seem to agree that there is a greater duty to
disclose latent, as opposed to patent, defects, but they disagree as
to the rationale for the distinction.22
In order to distinguish the concept of latent defect from that of
unequal access to information, we employ the term “latent defect”
Professor Paula Dalley illustrates the common-law rule regarding the disclosure of
personal intentions through the example of a horse trade. Dalley, Insider Trading, supra note 18, at 1328. In her example, the fact that the horse seller plans to leave town
shortly and is therefore willing to accept any price for the horse is personal information that need not be disclosed. Id.
22
Compare, e.g., Kronman, supra note 1, at 22–25 (arguing that requiring sellers to
disclose latent—but not patent—defects is an economically efficient policy because
sellers typically acquire information regarding latent defects casually and because requiring the disclosure of obvious defects increases transaction costs), with Scheppele,
supra note 2, at 134–38 (arguing that the distinction between latent and patent defects
is best justified on the grounds that latent defects are typically inaccessible to one of
the parties—generally the buyer).
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narrowly in this Article, as a term of art. Accordingly, as defined
here, only property (including slaves) can be subject to a latent defect—the term does not apply to all undisclosed and difficult-toaccess information.23 For example, an undisclosed illness or injury
affecting a person would not qualify as a latent defect in an application for insurance or employment, but would constitute a latent
defect in the sale of a slave.24 Similarly, in a stock transaction, the
fact that the issuer is about to become the subject of a takeover
bid, thus raising the stock price significantly, would not be considered a “defect,” although the information is certainly relevant to
the transaction and would greatly affect the purchase price. Consistent with the assertions of legal scholars, we predicted that courts
are more likely to impose disclosure duties when the withheld information relates to a latent defect.
4. The Information Concerned a Defect Likely to Cause Bodily
Injury or Property Damage
It has been argued that the law traditionally has taken a stricter
view with regard to information that, if disclosed, could prevent the
occurrence of bodily injury or property damage, as opposed to information that, if disclosed, would avoid mere economic loss.25 The
distinction seems defensible from an economic standpoint, as there
may be circumstances when it would be inefficient for the law to
correct an economic loss of one party (such as in some circumstances when the informed party has expended time and effort to
acquire the information). The same efficiency argument cannot be

23
See infra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (discussing fraudulent silence in
slave sales).
24
Compare Smith v. Rowzee, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 527, 531 (1821) (sale of diseased slave coded as latent defect), and Huntington v. Brown, 17 La. Ann. 48, 49
(1865) (same), with Leclerc v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 39 A.2d 763, 764 (1944) (illness in applicant for insurance not coded as latent defect). In both cases, however, information regarding the undisclosed injury or illness might be accessible to only one
party, meaning that the parties had unequal access to the information.
25
See Keeton, supra note 13, at 14–17, 36. Apparently, this reasoning dates back at
least to the time of St. Thomas Aquinas, who argued that vendors should be required
to reveal defects in the good sold if “the defect is of such a nature that it may cause
some damage to the buyer.” Pothier, supra note 10, ¶ 238, at 144 (criticizing Aquinas’s restrictive view of disclosure duties).
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made generally with regard to the prevention of bodily injury or
property damage.
For example, in older cases, some courts required the disclosure
of information concerning the presence of small pox or other dangerous germs, which, if known by the uninformed party, could have
prevented the contraction and spread of the disease.26 Modern examples may include the duty of tobacco companies to disclose the
health risks associated with cigarette smoking27 and the duty of
sellers of real property to disclose the presence of asbestos or lead
paint.28 Because this rule seems sensible from a policy perspective
26

See, e.g., Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 865 (8th Cir. 1903)
(“A manufacturer or vendor, who, without giving notice of its character or qualities,
supplies or delivers to another a machine or article which, at the time of delivery, he
knows to be imminently dangerous to the life or limbs of any one who may use it for
the purpose for which it is intended, is liable to any one who sustains injury from its
dangerous condition, whether he has any contractual relations with him or not.”);
Leech v. Husbands, 152 A. 729, 733 (Del. Super. Ct. 1930) (holding that the landlord’s
failure to disclose that a residence was “infested with vermin, bugs and disease germs”
constituted fraud, although the tenant waived his right to relief by failing to sue within
a reasonable time after discovering the defect); Cowen v. Sunderland, 14 N.E. 117,
118 (Mass. 1887) ( “It has thus been held that where one lets premises infected with
the small-pox, and injury occurred thereby, he was liable if, knowing this danger, he
omitted to inform the lessee.”).
27
Congress probably preempted any state common-law duties of cigarette manufacturers to disclose the health risks associated with smoking tobacco with the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, as amended by the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340 (2000). Together, these
statutes provide that, “[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this
chapter.” Id. § 1334(b). The Supreme Court has held that these statutes preempt state
law claims based on a failure to disclose material health risks to consumers through
advertising or promotion. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992).
In theory, claims based on a failure to disclose through other channels the health risks
associated with smoking are not preempted. Cf. Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
884 F. Supp. 1515, 1521 & n.4 (D. Kan. 1995) (refusing to dismiss plaintiff’s fraud
claim alleging that “the defendants knew that use of their products caused cancer and
vasculatory disease, yet willfully chose to conceal those facts from the public” and
noting that “it is possible that plaintiff can assert viable claims” of fraud at trial).
28
See Kezer v. Mark Stimson Assocs., 742 A.2d 898, 903 (Me. 1999) (applying a
Maine law that requires the disclosure of the existence of all hazardous materials including asbestos and lead-based paint); Stanley J. Levy, Asbestos and the Real Estate
Industry: The Legacy of the Magic Mineral, in The Impact of Asbestos on Real Estate
7, 29–30 (1989) (stating that the dangerous qualities of asbestos may create a duty to
disclose its known existence). But see Justice v. Anderson County, 955 S.W.2d 613,
617 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that the purchasers of a school building were not
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and can be traced back at least to the fourteenth century, we predicted that, when the failure to disclose information is likely to
cause physical injury or property damage, courts are more likely to
rule that a duty to disclose exists.
5. The Information Would Have Updated or Corrected Previously
Disclosed Information29
A duty to correct may arise if a statement is false when made
even if the speaker believes the information to be correct. If the
speaker subsequently discovers that the information earlier disclosed was false, he may have a duty to correct that information.
By contrast, a duty to update may arise in some instances if a
statement is correct when made, but later developments subsequently render the statement incorrect or misleading.30 The Reentitled to rescind the sales contract on the grounds that the property’s vendors—the
county and school district—fraudulently concealed the presence of asbestos in the
building, when the building was purchased “as is” at a public auction, the transaction
was arm’s length, there was no fiduciary relationship between the parties, and the
presence of asbestos was reasonably discoverable by purchasers).
29
Although many courts and commentators discussing the common law of nondisclosure do not distinguish between the duty to update and the duty to correct, federal
courts and commentators applying or discussing the federal securities laws consider
the distinction important, particularly as not all courts recognize a duty to update under the federal securities laws. See Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting
Mistaken Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 87, 118 (1999) (noting
that the Second and Third Circuits recognize a duty to update “forward looking” information under some circumstances).
The court in Oran v. Stafford explained the distinction between the duty to update
and the duty to correct well:
The duty to correct exists “when a company makes a historical statement that,
at the time made, the company believed to be true, but as revealed by subsequently discovered information actually was not.” . . . .
The duty to update, in contrast, “concerns statements that, although reasonable at the time made, become misleading when viewed in the context of subsequent events.”
Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 286 (2000) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1431 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted)).
We coded the duty to update and the duty to correct together, rather than separately, due to the difficulty of distinguishing one from the other, particularly in cases
where the court did not distinguish between the two or confused the two issues.
30
See Edward H. Wilson, Concealment or Silence as a Form of Fraud, and the Relief or Redress Afforded Therefor, Both in Law and in Equity, 5 The Counsellor 230,
236 (1895) (“Where one party has made a material representation which is true at the
time, but which subsequently, to his knowledge, but not the knowledge of the other,
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statement (Second) of Torts recognizes both a duty to correct and
a duty to update, by stating that a party to a business transaction is
under an obligation to disclose “subsequently acquired information
that he knows will make untrue or misleading a previous representation that when made was true or believed to be so.”31 We predicted that cases involving information that would have updated or
corrected previously disclosed information are more likely to result
in a finding that the informed party owed the uninformed party a
duty to disclose.
B. The Type of Transaction
Commentators also have asserted that the degree of required
disclosure depends on the type of transaction in question. In particular, they have asserted that courts require heightened disclosure in the cases of transactions between parties in a confidential or
fiduciary relationship; transactions concerning the acquisition of
insurance, surety, or a release from liability; transactions in which
the parties have unequal access to information; transactions concerning the transfer of real property; and transactions concerning
the sale or transfer of a slave.
1. A Transaction Between Parties in a Confidential or Fiduciary
Relationship
The most commonly asserted basis for the imposition of a duty
to disclose material information is the presence of a fiduciary or
confidential relationship between the parties to the transaction.32
Technically, confidential relationships (or “relationships of trust
and confidence” as they are typically labeled) differ from fiduciary

becomes, through the alteration of circumstances, untrue, it is his imperative duty to
communicate to the other information of the change in affairs.”).
31
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(c) (1976).
32
See, e.g., 1 Story, supra note 10, § 308, at 305; see also Bay Colony, Ltd. v. Trendmaker, Inc., 121 F.3d 998, 1004 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that Texas law recognizes a
duty to disclose which supports an action for fraud by nondisclosure only where a fiduciary or confidential relationship exists); Banque Arabe et Internationale
D’Investissement v. Md. Nat’l. Bank, 57 F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that an
affirmative duty to disclose arises from the need to complete a partial statement or
from a fiduciary or confidential relationship between the parties).
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relationships in that a fiduciary relationship arises out of the position of the parties relative to each other, while a confidential relationship arises from the conduct of the parties or from the nature
of the transaction that is the subject of the dispute.33 For purposes
of this Article, however, the distinction is irrelevant. We hypothesize that both types of relationships lead to greater disclosure requirements than do arms-length relationships, and accordingly, we
make no attempt to distinguish fiduciary relationships from those
that are merely confidential.
Unfortunately, although the fiduciary character of some relationships is clear—such as principal and agent, corporate officer or
director and shareholder, or trustee and beneficiary—the fiduciary
or confidential nature of other relationships is not so clear, or
might vary from state to state or across the time frame of our
study.34 In fact, courts have purposely failed to provide an exhaustive list of fiduciary relationships, preferring instead loose standards that allow judges to consider the specific facts of each case.35
In order to avoid the difficulties and subjective decisions that could
lead to errors in coding such cases, we adopted bright-line rules

33
For example, the relationship between two family members may or may not be
confidential depending on factors such as whether they typically entrust confidential
information to one another or whether they enjoy a congenial relationship. In contrast, because of the status of a trust manager as a fiduciary to the trust beneficiary,
the trust manager owes the trust beneficiary a fiduciary duty that cannot be diminished through daily interactions that suggest the relationship is not one of trust and
confidence. See George Gleason Bogert, Confidential Relations and Unenforcible
Express Trusts, 13 Cornell L.Q. 237, 248 (1928) (discussing the difference between
confidential and fiduciary relationships); Richard W. Painter, Kimberly D. Krawiec,
& Cynthia A. Williams, Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading after United States v.
O’Hagan, 84 Va. L. Rev. 153, 176–77 nn.101–03 (1998) (same).
34
A common (but not exhaustive) list of recognized fiduciaries would include the
following: executors, guardians, trustees, attorneys, and, to an extent, corporate directors and senior executives. See John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between
Law and Ethics, 19 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 117, 150 (1981).
35
Id. (“The common law has in fact always defined the term [fiduciary] with deliberate imprecision . . . .”); see also Harper v. Adametz, 113 A.2d. 136, 139 (Conn. 1955)
(stating that the court has purposefully refrained from defining a fiduciary relationship in precise detail that would exclude new situations); Karen E. Boxx, The Durable
Power of Attorney’s Place in the Family of Fiduciary Relationships, 36 Ga. L. Rev. 1,
15 (2001) (“A clear characterization of fiduciary obligation is elusive and its exact nature is much debated.”).
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that suit the purposes of our study but might not technically conform to the law.
For example, the traditional common-law rule was that corporate officers and directors owed fiduciary duties only to the corporation itself, or to the shareholders as a unit, and not to the individual shareholders of the corporation.36 Accordingly, courts often
ruled that officers and directors could trade with shareholders
based on material non-public information without disclosing such
information.37 On the other hand, some courts, often invoking the
“special facts” doctrine, refused to permit such transactions by corporate officers and directors without full disclosure.38 Because fiduciary obligations to individual shareholders were not recognized at
this time, some commentators have used these cases as evidence
36

Allen v. Curtis, 26 Conn. 456, 461 (1857) (“[T]he directors of the bank are the
agents of the bank. The bank is the only principal, and there is no such trust for, or
relation to, a stockholder as has been claimed by the plaintiff.”); Bd. of Comm’rs of
Tippecanoe County v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509, 513–16 (1873) (stating that directors
owe the shareholders as a unit a fiduciary duty when dealing with the corporation’s
business or property, but that no such duty is owed by an officer or director to an individual shareholder when transacting for the purchase or sale of stock in the corporation); Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371, 384 (1847) (“There is no legal privity,
relation, or immediate connexion, between the holders of shares in a bank, in their
individual capacity, on the one side, and the directors of the bank on the other. The
directors are not the bailees, the factors, agents or trustees of such individual stockholders.”).
37
Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 191 (7th Cir. 1978) (“Absent fraud, the traditional common law approach has been to permit officers and directors of corporations
to trade in their corporation’s securities free from liability to other traders for failing
to disclose inside information.”); Adams v. Mid-West Chevrolet Corp., 179 P.2d 147,
156 (Okla. 1946) (“The general rule is that officers and directors . . . cannot deal with
the property of the corporation for their own personal benefit or advantage. But this
duty does not extend to the outstanding stock of the corporation for the reason that
such stock is the individual property of the respective stockholders and not in any
sense the corporation’s property.”).
38
Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909) (“That the defendant was a director of
the corporation is but one of the facts upon which the liability is asserted, the existence of all the others in addition making such a combination as rendered it the plain
duty of the defendant to speak.”). Those other facts included that Repide owned seventy-five percent of the stock of the company, was administrator general of the company, was the chief negotiator for the company in talks that eventually led to the sale
of all of the company’s property, and was in reality acting as an agent for all of the
other shareholders in such negotiations. Id. at 431–32; see also Freeman, 584 F.2d at
191 (“A few jurisdictions now require disclosure where certain ‘special facts’ exist,
and some even impose a strict fiduciary duty on the insider vis-à-vis the selling shareholder.”).
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that courts apply an equality of access doctrine to determine when
disclosure will be required.39
We believe, however, that such cases are better understood as a
precursor to today’s doctrine of officer and director fiduciary duties rather than as evidence of a broad insistence by courts that
parties to transactions have equal access to information. We thus
coded these cases as fiduciary duty cases (as well as unequal access
cases in most instances), despite the fact that the court might not
have invoked this rationale and might even have specifically rejected it.
Similarly, whether some relationships are confidential in nature
varies from state to state or with the specific circumstances of the
relationship. An examination of the law governing marital relations
helps to illustrate the point. Some states consider marriage an inherently fiduciary relationship while others hold that marital relations might or might not be confidential, depending on the circumstances.40 Some states hold that a fiduciary or confidential
relationship automatically begins with engagement while others do
not.41 Courts also differ in the extent to which they treat married
but separated persons as parties to a confidential or fiduciary relationship.42
39
See, e.g., Strong, 213 U.S. at 433–34 (holding that agents of Repide, the chief
shareholder, and the director of the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company
should have disclosed to prospective sellers of the company’s shares that they were
acting on behalf of Repide, who was also the company’s chief negotiator for a U.S.
government contract); Scheppele, supra note 2, at 113–14 (arguing that the Court’s
ruling in Strong is explainable on equal access grounds, and not on fiduciary duty
grounds, because the court explicitly rejected the proposition that corporate directors
owe shareholders special disclosure obligations).
40
Compare, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting
that marriage is not per se a fiduciary relationship), with DeLorean v. DeLorean, 511
A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986) (noting that marriage is a fiduciary
relationship).
41
Compare, e.g., In re Marriage of Sokolowski, 597 N.E.2d 675, 680 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (noting that a confidential relationship begins at engagement under Illinois
law), and Lightman v. Magid, 394 S.W.2d 151, 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965) (noting that
a confidential relationship ordinarily exists at engagement), with Handley v. Handley,
248 P.2d 59, 62 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (holding that the presumption of a confidential relationship did not exist prior to marriage).
42
Compare, e.g., Harroff v. Harroff, 398 S.E.2d 340, 343 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that married persons owe each other fiduciary duties while negotiating a separation agreement), with In re Marriage of Auble, 866 P.2d 1239, 1244 (Or. Ct. App.
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To avoid the daunting task of mastering the intricacies of the law
of confidential relations in all fifty states, as well as the necessity of
subjective judgment calls concerning whether the circumstances of
a particular relationship make it confidential, we adopted brightline rules that reflected the weight of authority and applied them
across all jurisdictions. For example, we treated engaged persons
negotiating a prenuptial agreement as parties to a confidential relationship in all 50 states, despite the fact that this is not the law in all
jurisdictions under all circumstances. This bright-line approach did
not trouble us, given our hypothesis that, despite asserted differences across jurisdictions in the law of confidential relations, as a
general matter, courts impose a heavier disclosure obligation in
cases where the relation between the parties could be considered
fiduciary or confidential, such as a familial or marital relationship,
than they do when the parties share a merely arms-length relationship. We thus predicted a significant, positive relationship between
the likelihood of the court imposing disclosure duties and the existence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship.
2. The Transaction Concerned Insurance, Surety, or a Release from
Liability
Professor W. Page Keeton described this theory best: “In releases, in contracts of insurance, and in contracts of suretyship,
practically all facts affecting the matter must be disclosed.”43 The
most commonly asserted rationale for this rule, particularly as regards insurance, is that the insured likely has knowledge affecting
the contract that is unavailable to the insurance underwriter.44
1993) (holding that married persons living apart may not owe each other fiduciary duties in the negotiation of a separation agreement).
43
Keeton, supra note 13, at 36; Wilson, supra note 30, at 231. But see Scheppele, supra note 2, at 147–48 (arguing that when the insurer and insured have equal access to
information, disclosure is not required).
44
Scheppele, supra note 2, at 146–48; Verplanck, supra note 18, at 37–38 (“The insured being the party from whom, in most cases, the underwriter obtains the special
facts upon which the calculation of the risk is settled . . . . Every fact within his knowledge, regarding which ignorance or mistake might possibly induce the underwriter to
compute his risk upon an incorrect basis . . . is considered in law as a material fact, and
misrepresentation or suppression of it avoids the policy.”). But see Kronman, supra
note 1, at 26–27 (explaining the rule that health or life insurance applicants owe the
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Some modern commentators have urged the abolition of the rule
of full disclosure in insurance contracts on the grounds that the rule
originated in the context of maritime insurance, when vessels were
typically insured once they were already at sea and could not be inspected.45 Accordingly, they argue that such rules have no place in
modern insurance practice, in which the insurance company typically can and does conduct a thorough inspection of the insured
property or person.46 Nonetheless, we predicted that courts are
more likely to find a duty to disclose when the transaction concerns
the acquisition of insurance, surety, or a release from liability.
3. The Transaction Was One in Which the Parties Had Unequal
Access to Information
One of the most lasting, if controversial, theories seeking to explain why courts require disclosure of all material facts in some
transactions but not others is the theory that courts will require
disclosure whenever the parties have unequal access to information
(the “equality of access theory”).47 Professor Kim Lane Scheppele
has elegantly defined equal access in terms of both structural
equality and equality of aptitude. For example, she states that
“[t]wo actors will be said to have equal access to information if
they (1) have equal probabilities of finding the information if they
insurer a duty of full candor on the grounds that information regarding the health of
the applicant is nearly always casually acquired).
45
See, e.g., Bertram Harnett, The Doctrine of Concealment: A Remnant in the Law
of Insurance, 15 Law & Contemp. Probs. 391, 398–99, 407–10, 413–14 (1950).
46
Id. at 407–10, 413–14.
47
Carter v. Boehm, (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1162, 1164 (K.B.) (“[E]ither party may be
innocently silent, as to grounds open to both, to exercise their judgment upon.”); Jenkins v. McCormick, 339 P.2d 8, 11 (Kan. 1959) (“There is much authority to the effect
that if one party to a contract or transaction has superior knowledge, or knowledge
which is not within the fair and reasonable reach of the other party and which he
could not discover by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or means of knowledge
which are not open to both parties alike, he is under a legal obligation to speak.”
(quoting 23 Am. Jur. Fraud and Deceit § 80 (1940)); Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv. L.
Rev. 322, 354–55 (1979) (defining equality of access as an informational advantage
that cannot be overcome legally by the uninformed party, regardless of her diligence
or monetary resources); Wilson, supra note 30, at 234 (“[T]he common law imposes
no duty of disclosure where the facts suppressed are equally accessible to both parties
to the transaction.”).
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put in the same level of effort and (2) are capable of making this
equivalent level of effort.”48
People most often have different probabilities of information detection because of structural inequality—in other words, they
“have structurally unequal access to knowledge.”49 In contrast,
when two people are unable to expend the same level of effort in
information production, it is most often because one does not even
realize that the information might exist, or is too lacking in intellectual capability or social knowledge to compete with more sophisticated parties.50
Relying on Laidlaw to underpin her theory, Professor Scheppele
points to Chief Justice Marshall’s dictum that “[i]t would be difficult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine [that is, the doctrine that
disclosure is required] within proper limits, where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties”51 to develop an argument that the case outcome can be explained by the fact that the
parties had equal access to information. This assumption might
seem surprising, given the clear evidence that, due to Organ’s special connection to the only three people in New Orleans with
knowledge of the end of the war, Laidlaw could not have discovered the information without expending considerably more effort
than Organ. Scheppele argues, however, that Organ’s discovery of
the information was purely fortuitous—Laidlaw was just as likely
as Organ to have a partner with a brother aboard the British fleet
who came ashore during the night with news that the war had
ended.52
Despite Professor Scheppele’s innovative attempts to clarify the
equality of access theory, it remains extraordinarily open-ended
and subjective, leading many critics, including one of the present
authors, to dismiss the test as providing no meaningful guidance for

48

Scheppele, supra note 2, at 120.
Id.
50
Id. at 121.
51
Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 195.
52
Scheppele, supra note 2, at 122 (“It seems that Organ got his information through
a friend who had a brother in the know. Laidlaw’s agent, if he had had the same fortune, also could have got the information this way.”).
49
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courts.53 Needless to say, reasonable minds can wildly differ on
what constitutes equal access, and coding for a factor so susceptible
to personal interpretation was difficult.
Nonetheless, we attempted to address the problem by laying
down bright-line rules. Most importantly, in contrast to Professor
Scheppele, we defined access as purely structural. Even gross differences in education or knowledge did not impact our determination of whether equality of access was lacking. Instead, we dealt
with such differences by including a separate code for parties who
are illiterate, elderly, severely ill, or extraordinarily mentally deficient in some way (although still competent to contract).54
Furthermore, we did not, as some commentators might, automatically code purchasers and sellers of real or personal property
as having unequal access to information. Instead, if a casual inspection of the property would have revealed the undisclosed information, then we concluded that the parties had equal access to the information in question, despite the fact that purchasers must have
sellers’ permission before inspecting the property. We felt that this
definition was reasonable, given the ease with which the purchaser
could request and execute such an inspection, and the suspicion
that should arise in the purchaser’s mind if the seller refuses the
request. Based on the work of Professor Scheppele and other
equality of access advocates, we predicted that courts are more
likely to impose disclosure duties when the parties have unequal
access to the withheld information.

53
For example, one of the present authors has argued previously that, because both
individual aptitude and structural access vary across the population in relation to
wealth and education, no two people are ever truly equal. Instead, access is a continuum on which cases of clear inequality or relative equality can be identified at the extremes, but that none of the definitions endorsed by the equality of access advocates
gives meaningful guidance as to where to draw the line in the large majority of cases,
which fall in the middle of the continuum. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency
& Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95
Nw. U. L. Rev. 443 (2001); see also Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider
Trading, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 313, 314–21 (2002) (raising a similar argument).
54
See infra Section I.D.3 (discussing this variable).
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4. The Transaction Concerned the Transfer of Real Property
It has been argued by some commentators that courts impose a
greater duty of disclosure with regard to the transfer of real property than in other types of transactions, a rule that apparently dates
back to the Roman civil law.55 At common law, this rule might have
been the result of implied warranties of habitability and title.56 In
many states today, much of the common law in this area has been
superseded by statutes that mandate high levels of disclosure in
real estate transactions, particularly residential ones. We predicted
that courts are more likely to impose a duty to disclose when the
transaction concerns the transfer of real property.
5. The Transaction Concerned the Transfer of a Slave
Slavery cases of all kinds have understandably generated significant interest not only in the legal literature, but in history and economics as well.57 Although one might expect that courts would
formulate different disclosure rules in slave sale cases than in other
sale of goods cases, in recognition of the fact that the property at
issue is a human being, a review of the cases should quickly disabuse the reader of that notion.
For example, courts could have used the rule that bargaining
parties have a duty to disclose defects likely to cause personal injury as a basis for imposing a duty to disclose any illness or injury
55
See, e.g., Cicero, On Moral Obligation (De Oficiis) ¶ 65, at 159 (John
Higginbotham trans., Univ. of Calif. Press 1967) (“As far as estates are concerned, it
is laid down in our civil law that all faults known to the seller be declared at the time
of the sale.”). See generally John V. Orth, Sale of Defective Houses, 6 Green Bag 163
(2003) (discussing the common law of disclosure in connection with the sale of real
property).
56
As to title, see Pothier, supra note 10, ¶ 240, at 145 (noting that the vendor must
declare “that the thing does not belong to him; that it does not belong to him irrevocably; or that it is subject to certain charges, annuities (rentes) [sic], or special hypothecations”).
57
See, e.g., 1 Judicial Cases concerning American Slavery and the Negro (Helen T.
Catterall ed., William S. Hein & Co. 1998) (1926); Judith Kelleher Schafer, Slavery,
the Civil Law, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana (1994); Andrew Fede, Legal Protection for Slave Buyers in the U.S. South: A Caveat Concerning Caveat Emptor, 31
Am. J. Legal Hist. 322 (1987); Mark Tushnet, New Histories of the Private Law of
Slavery, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 301 (1996); Jenny B. Wahl, The Jurisprudence of American Slave Sales, 56 J. Econ. Hist. 143 (1996).
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in a slave, the rationale being that lack of disclosure prevents the
purchaser from seeking medical attention for the slave. Instead,
however, courts of the era deciding disclosure issues seem to have
treated slaves much like any other personal property.58
This is not to say, however, that special disclosure rules did not
arise in connection with slavery cases. In fact, economic and legal
historians have argued that, although the southern states generally
observed a rule of strict caveat emptor much more frequently than
did the northeastern states, southern states attempted to regulate
the slavery market because of the importance of the slave trade to
the southern economy, in part by imposing disclosure duties on
parties to a slave sale.59 Interestingly, this rule too dates back to
Roman law.60 We predicted that courts are more likely to find that
the informed party has a duty to disclose when the transaction involves the sale of a slave.
C. How the Information Was Acquired
Many commentators have argued that the method by which the
undisclosed information was acquired has an impact on whether
courts require disclosure of the information. Specifically, it has
been asserted that courts more frequently require the disclosure of

58
In fact, the argument that illness or injury in a slave falls within the wellrecognized exception for disclosures of defects likely to cause bodily injury was not
raised in any of the cases in our dataset, presumably because of the deeply ingrained
notion among many southerners of that era (including judges and counsel in the
cases) that the southern legal system treats slaves as goods, rather than as individuals
whose well-being should be protected by the legal system. See Wahl, supra note 57, at
146 n.7 (referring to livestock sales as slave sales’ “closest relative”).
59
See, e.g., Fede, supra note 57 (arguing that slave sales were more heavily policed
by the courts, which imposed protections such as warranties of titles and soundness,
foreshadowing the development of the U.C.C.); Wahl, supra note 57, at 146–49 (arguing that southern courts imposed higher disclosure obligations in slave sales than in
other sales transactions). But see Dalley, Law of Deceit, supra note 2, at 430 (finding
less protection of buyers against fraud in slave cases than in some other types of cases,
such as those involving land, horses, and corporate securities).
60
Cicero, supra note 55, ¶ 71, at 161 (“It is not only in the sphere of real estate that
civil law, which is based on the natural law, condemns trickery and fraud, but also in
the case of slave-purchase the buyer is protected by law against deception. Indeed an
edict of the aediles lays down that if the seller knows that the slave is a weakling, a
runaway or a thief, he must (except in the case of an inherited slave) declare it.”).
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casually acquired information and information acquired through
illegal or tortious means.
1. The Information Was Casually, as Opposed to Deliberately,
Acquired
That the law should reward those who expend time and effort to
acquire information by permitting them to reap the benefits of
bargaining with others without revealing that information is one of
the earliest theories offered by legal commentators to explain the
law of fraudulent silence. In De Officiis, Cicero constructs a hypothetical in which a merchant sails to Rhodes from Alexandria with
a shipment of corn during a time of great famine in Rhodes.61 The
merchant knows that other ships have set sail from Alexandria to
Rhodes with enough corn to alleviate the famine and will arrive
shortly. In an imaginary dialogue, the Stoic philosophers Antipater
and Diogenes debate whether the merchant should be required to
reveal all that he knows.62
Discussing the hypothetical in his 1761 Treatise on Obligations,
the French legal theorist R.J. Pothier agrees with Cicero’s conclusion that the merchant should disclose his secret information. He
acknowledges, however, that the majority of other writers on the
subject have considered the merchant’s profits to be made by nondisclosure “not an unjust profit; but a just reward for the diligence
which enabled him to arrive the first, and for the risk which he ran
of losing his merchandise, if any of the accidents, to which he was
exposed, should have prevented his arrival at the time.”63 Similarly,
writing in 1936, Professor W. Page Keeton argued that the manner
in which the informed party acquired his information is relevant to
courts’ determinations of disclosure duties, noting that, “[t]he in61

Id. ¶ 50, at 153–54.
Id. ¶¶ 51–53, at 154. In the hypothetical, Antipater argues that “he should tell
everything, so that the buyer can be just as much in possession of the facts as the
seller.” Id. ¶ 51, at 154. Diogenes responds that “these bonds [of social unity] are not
such that a man may not have anything to call his own. If that is so, there is not even
any selling to be done, only giving.” Id. ¶ 53, at 154.
63
Pothier, supra note 10, ¶ 242, at 148. Although he agrees with Cicero’s conclusions, Pothier also notes, “[t]he decision of Cicero meets with much difficulty even in
the forum of conscience. The greater number of those who have written upon natural
law have regarded it as going too far.” Id.
62
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formation might have been acquired as the result of his bringing to
bear a superior knowledge, intelligence, skill or technical judgment,” or “it might have been acquired by mere chance.”64
Professor Anthony Kronman elaborated on this theory by arguing that the seemingly inconsistent results in similar cases involving
the nondisclosure of relevant facts could be reconciled by noting
that when nondisclosure is permitted, the knowledge involved is
typically the result of a deliberate search.65 Kronman argued that a
rule permitting silence in such instances was a sensible economic
policy, as it represented the only effective means of providing incentives for the production of costly information that would not
normally be discovered, absent a deliberate search.66 Although
Kronman conceded that Organ’s information appeared to be acquired fortuitously, rather than deliberately (recall that Organ’s
business partner’s brother had been at sea with the British fleet
and arrived in New Orleans during the middle of the night, tipping
Organ about the soon-to-be-disclosed news of the war’s end), he
believed that this did not undermine his theory. Instead, Kronman
argued that Marshall’s decision resulted from an attempt to lay
down a blanket rule concerning the disclosure of market information, which is typically, though not always, deliberately acquired.67
Like Professor Kronman, we define “deliberately acquired information” as “information whose acquisition entails costs which
would not have been incurred but for the likelihood, however
64
Keeton, supra note 13, at 25. See also Hays v. Meyers, 107 S.W. 287, 288 (Ky.
1908) (stating that a party has no duty to disclose “the superior knowledge of property
he desires to purchase that has been acquired by skill, energy, vigilance, and other legitimate means” and stating further that “[i]f any other rule were adopted, it would
have a depressing tendency on trade and commerce by removing the incentive to
speculation and profit that lies at the foundation of almost every business venture”);
Wilson, supra note 30, at 231 (“[T]he common law . . . declares that men should as a
general rule take care of themselves, and that some incentive to diligence and discretion in their affairs should be afforded, by giving them, in ordinary transactions, the
benefit of their industry and discernment.”).
65
Kronman, supra note 1, at 9. Although Professor Kronman limited his theory to
“socially productive information,” we find this distinction unnecessary to test his hypothesis. In practice, it is difficult to conceive of examples of failures to disclose socially unproductive information that would result in demonstrable damages to the
plaintiff, thus resulting in litigation and written judicial opinions.
66
Id.
67
See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
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great, that the information in question would actually be produced.”68 The costs of acquiring such information might include not
only direct search costs, but also the costs of developing any
needed expertise, such as, for example, the costs of attending business school or studying the values of art or antiques.69
Casually acquired information, by contrast, is information the
acquisition of which entails costs that would have been incurred
even if the information were not forthcoming.70 To illustrate, a
businessman who overhears information while riding on a bus has
acquired the information casually, except in the unlikely event that
he rides buses specifically for that purpose.71
Professor Kronman recognized that, although analytically useful,
the determination as to whether any given piece of information
was deliberately or casually acquired in any instance was a difficult
one for courts to make in the real world.72 Accordingly, he argued
that, rather than make case-by-case determinations as to the manner of information acquisition, courts should adopt blanket rules
regarding whether the kind of information involved in a particular
class of case (say, real estate purchases, or the sale of a good with a
latent defect) was generally more likely to be generated deliberately or casually, as doing so would be more efficient.73
In contrast to using Professor Kronman’s classification of the
case in question, we judged whether information was acquired
casually or deliberately based on the facts of the case. We did this
for several reasons. First, although Kronman discussed general
rules as to the likely means of information acquisition in certain
classes of cases (for example, market information, the knowledge
of purchasers and sellers of real property, and information relating
to the health of an applicant for health or life insurance), he did
not lay down general classifications for every possible range of
facts. Accordingly, any attempt to apply blanket rules would have

68

Kronman, supra note 1, at 13.
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 13 & n.38
72
Id. at 13.
73
Id. at 17–18.
69
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required significant fact-specific inquiry to create such rules for all
classes of cases contained in our sample set.
Second, coding individual cases on their own facts enabled us to
test not only the robustness of the deliberately/casually acquired
distinction, but also Professor Kronman’s empirical claims as to the
likely mode of information acquisition in those classes of cases for
which he suggested blanket rules. In other words, coding in this
manner permitted us to judge, for example, whether extrinsic information is typically acquired deliberately, as contended by
Kronman.
Other commentators disagree that the deliberately/casually acquired information distinction is a meaningful predictor of the outcomes of fraudulent silence cases.74 Our own view embarking on
this project was that, regardless of whether Professor Kronman’s
theory was sound from an economic policy perspective, it was difficult to apply in practice and had not been embraced by courts outside the Seventh Circuit.75 Despite these critiques of Kronman’s
conjecture, we predicted a significant relationship between
whether the information was casually acquired and the likelihood
that a court would impose disclosure duties.
2. The Information Was Acquired Through Illegal or Tortious
Means
Courts and commentators often take the position that information acquired by illegal or tortious means must be disclosed to a
contracting counterparty.76 A standard example is that if A trespasses upon B’s land and while there conducts a test and deter74

See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 2, at 68–69, 85; Scheppele, supra note 2, at 124–26.
The influence of Judges Easterbrook and Posner in the Seventh Circuit, their embrace of law and economics principles, and their familiarity with academic theory led
us to this hypothesis. See, e.g., FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614, 619 (7th Cir.
1989) (Posner, J.) (opining that a seller had a duty to disclose material information
obtained “without substantial investment . . . which the buyer would find either impossible or very costly to discover himself”).
76
See, e.g., Mallon Oil v. Brown/Edwards Assoc., 965 P.2d 105, 111–12 (Colo. 1998);
George Spencer Bower, The Law of Actionable Misrepresentation 107 (Sir Alexander Kingcome Turner ed., 3d ed. 1974); Keeton, supra note 13, at 25–26; Donna M.
Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A PostO’Hagan Suggestion, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 1223, 1290–92 (1998).
75
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mines that oil is located on the land, if A subsequently purchases
the land from B without disclosing to B the presence of oil on his
land, B might have a right to rescind the contract.77 We predicted
that courts are significantly more likely to find a duty to disclose
when the information is acquired by illegal or tortious means.
D. Characteristics of the Uninformed Party
Commentators frequently assert that court rulings are influenced
by certain characteristics of the uninformed party. We hypothesized that courts require disclosure more frequently when the uninformed party is a buyer or lessee; when the uninformed party is
female; and when the uninformed party is sick, disabled, illiterate,
elderly, or otherwise severely disadvantaged in the bargaining relationship, although still competent to contract.
1. The Uninformed Party Was the Buyer or Lessee
Commentators seem to agree that sellers have a higher obligation to disclose information affecting the value of the transaction
than do buyers, although they disagree as to why courts make this
distinction.78 Professor Keeton explains the rule as follows: “The
buyer is not ordinarily expected to disclose information greatly af-

77
Keeton, supra note 13, at 26; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161
cmt. d, illus. 11 (1979) (stating that information acquired through trespass must be disclosed).
78
See, e.g., Pothier, supra note 10, ¶¶ 294–98, at 180–82 (stating that vendees have
lesser disclosure obligations than vendors because the vendor ought to be aware of
the value of what he sells); Scheppele, supra note 2, at 130–33 (arguing that sellers
have greater disclosure duties than purchasers because sellers are more likely to have
access to the information in question); DeMott, supra note 2, at 76 (“[B]uyers in many
settings are able to withhold with impunity information comparable to information
that a seller is obliged to disclose.”); William B. Goldfarb, Fraud and Nondisclosure in
the Vendor-Purchaser Relation, 8 W. Res. L. Rev. 5, 26 (1956) (arguing that sellers
have disclosure duties that exceed those of buyers); Kronman, supra note 1, at 22–23
(stating that buyers in a real estate context have lesser disclosure obligations than
sellers because buyers are likely to acquire their information deliberately, whereas
sellers are more likely to acquire their information casually); Andrew Kull, Unilateral
Mistake: The Baseball Card Case, 70 Wash. U. L.Q. 57, 62 & n.7 (1992) (arguing that
sellers are more often found to have a duty to disclose material information unknown
to the buyer because sellers are subject to implied warranties, whereas buyers are
not).
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fecting the value of the property which is the subject-matter of the
sale, whereas the seller is expected to disclose defects in the property sold which greatly decrease the value of the property.”79
Given this widespread agreement among commentators, we predicted that courts are significantly more likely to impose disclosure
duties when the uninformed party is the buyer.
2. The Uninformed Party Was Female
Historically, courts and legislatures have used a variety of theories to limit the rights of women to contract freely. For example, in
the early twentieth century, courts upheld laws designed to improve working conditions for women against challenges based on
interference with the freedom of contract—challenges that had
been used successfully to invalidate similar laws that applied to
men.80
Sometimes, the limitations on women’s freedom of contract are
explicit, as they were under the doctrine of coverture, which
treated the family as a unit and the husband as the head of that
unit. As a result of coverture, married women were not permitted
to enter into contracts or sue or be sued in court.81
79

Keeton, supra note 13, at 35–36.
Compare, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding unconstitutional a state law regulating working hours), with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (upholding a Washington state statute setting minimum
wages for women only); see also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416 (1908) (upholding an Oregon statute establishing maximum working hours for women, but not for
men); Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass. 383, 385 (1876) (upholding a
Massachusetts statute prohibiting the employment of women and persons under the
age of eighteen in any manufacturing establishment for more than sixty hours per
week). But see Children’s Hosp. v. Adkins, 284 F. 613, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1922) (invalidating a District of Columbia law setting minimum wages for women but not for men);
Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454, 462 (Ill. 1895) (invalidating an Illinois law limiting the
working hours of women).
81
See generally Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and
the Globe, 111 Yale L.J. 619, 636 (2001) (discussing the law of coverture); Reva B.
Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and
the Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 982–83 (2002) (same). In theory at least, restrictions on women’s rights to contract under the doctrine of coverture were abolished
during the nineteenth century, with the widespread passage of married women’s
property acts. Id. at 983 (“It is often said that the married women’s property acts abolished the common law of coverture in the nineteenth century—a legal fiction if ever
there was one. Even the briefest look at antisuffrage discourse reveals that core con80
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Other limitations on women’s freedom of contract are more subtle, as when women, due to their “delicate” nature or a perceived
need to protect them from their own bad bargains, are permitted to
rescind their contracts based on protective doctrines such as fraud,
duress, or unconscionability, when the same contract would have
been enforced against a man.82 We hypothesized, therefore, that
these gendered notions might have found their way into the law of
fraudulent silence, especially in older cases, and predicted that a
court is more likely to find a duty to disclose secret information
when the uninformed party is female than when the uninformed
party is male.
3. The Uninformed Party Was Sick, Disabled, Illiterate, or Elderly,
Though Competent to Contract
It has been argued that, in the law of fraudulent silence, as elsewhere, courts often rule in favor of sympathetic plaintiffs.83 Accordingly, courts might impose disclosure duties more readily when the
uninformed party is competent to contract, but is sick, disabled, illiterate, elderly, or extraordinarily mentally deficient in some way.
Our goal was to identify contracting parties who even the most
cepts of coverture were a vibrant part of American legal culture well into the twentieth century and shaped public as well as private law.”).
82
See, e.g., Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 Am. U. L. Rev. 1065, 1085–86 (1985) (arguing that, in Jackson v.
Seymour, the court allowed Lucy Jackson to rescind a contract for the sale of land to
her brother because of “gendered ideas” about the vulnerability and financial dependence of widows, rather than because of the confidential nature of their relationship); Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 Ind. L. Rev. 1247, 1262
(1999) (stating that, “[m]any contract doctrines are paternalistic in the sense of protecting the ‘weaker’ or disadvantaged party: concealment, misrepresentation, unilateral mistake, undue influence, duress, unconscionability, minority, and lack of capacity all could be said to have a protectionist cast,” and noting further that, “[f]eminists
have just begun to question whether paternalistic doctrines like unconscionability
help or harm women”). But see Margo Schlanger, Injured Women before Common
Law Courts, 1860–1930, 21 Harv. Women’s L.J. 79, 140 (1998) (finding that courts
fairly “treated gender as an important factor in assessing appropriate standards of
care, where perceived gender difference was highlighted” in tort cases).
83
Cf. DeMott, supra note 2, at 97 (“To an unusual degree, judicial opinions in
[fraudulent silence] cases . . . personalize the parties.”); Strudler, supra note 4, at 340
(arguing that nondisclosure law should “pay attention to the moral drama that occurs
in bargaining and to the sources of individual negotiators’ grievances about exploitation, deception, and betrayal”).
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conservative courts might readily consider easy targets in need of
protection from unscrupulous predators. We predicted, therefore,
that courts are significantly more likely to impose a duty to disclose
when the uninformed party is sick, disabled, elderly, or illiterate.
E. Behavior of the Informed Party
Just as the characteristics of the uninformed party might impact
court rulings, the informed party’s behavior might influence court
decisions regarding the need for disclosure in any given transaction. Specifically, when the informed party has “behaved badly,”
courts might be more likely to punish or discourage such behavior
through the imposition of disclosure duties that deprive the informed party of the opportunity to legally profit from her secret information. Accordingly, we examined two types of bad behavior by
the informed party: affirmative misrepresentations or half-truths
that accompany the undisclosed information, and active concealment of the undisclosed information.
1. The Informed Party Made Affirmative Misrepresentations or
Half-Truths
Fraudulent silence claims often form one part of a larger claim in
which other wrongs are alleged, such as affirmative misrepresentations or half-truths. Although technically courts should rule on
each count of the complaint separately and should not allow a finding that the informed party intentionally misrepresented one fact
to impact the court’s finding on liability for a different, undisclosed
fact,84 we believe that courts are often swayed by a general pattern
of bad conduct on the part of the informed party.85 Accordingly, we
would expect to see disclosure required more often when the in-

84
This is the case unless, of course, the informed party’s lies somehow prevented the
uninformed party from learning the truth.
85
Wilson, supra note 30, at 234 (“‘If a word . . . if a single word, be dropped which
tends to mislead the vendor’ it will vitiate the contract. Thus it is, that in the mass of
cases in which concealment or fraudulent silence appears, there is also present this
misrepresentation . . . .” (quoting Turner v. Harvey, (1821) 37 Eng. Rep. 814, 818 (Ch.
D.))).
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formed party also made affirmative misrepresentations or halftruths than when the informed party was truly silent.
A half-truth is a statement that, although technically accurate, is
nonetheless misleading in some way.86 As stated in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, “[a] representation stating the truth so far as it
goes but which the maker knows or believes to be materially misleading because of his failure to state additional or qualifying matter is a fraudulent misrepresentation.”87
Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that “[a]
statement may be true with respect to the facts stated, but may fail
to include qualifying matter necessary to prevent the implication of
an assertion that is false with respect to other facts.”88 To illustrate,
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts notes that a true statement
that an event has recently occurred might nonetheless mislead, if it
creates the false impression that matters have not changed subsequently.89
Professor Donald Langevoort has correctly noted that there is
no bright line between affirmative misrepresentations and halftruths, or between half-truths and nondisclosure.90 Instead, all three
arise in transactional settings in which the parties typically trade
large amounts of information and, thus, represent a continuum,
making coding at the margins sometimes difficult.91 Nonetheless,
we predicted that courts are more likely to impose a duty to disclose when the informed party lied or told a half-truth in the same
transaction in which she failed to disclose material information,

86
Langevoort, supra note 29, at 88–89; see also Goldfarb, supra note 78, at 24
(“While silence alone may not be actionable, if the vendor undertakes to speak, he
must not conceal anything which would tend to qualify or contradict the facts which
he had stated. In other words, to tell half of the truth is to make a half-false representation.”).
87
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 529 (1976). The Restatement elaborates, “[A]
statement that contains only favorable matters and omits all reference to unfavorable
matters is as much a false representation as if all the facts stated were untrue.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 529 cmt. a (1976).
88
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 159 cmt. b (1979).
89
Id.
90
Langevoort, supra note 29, at 95–96.
91
Id. at 96; cf. Goldfarb, supra note 78, at 25 (noting that “a business transaction is
never entirely without conversation, and verbal exchanges nearly always involve, expressly or by implication, representations of fact”).
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than when the informed party’s silence is unaccompanied by lies or
half-truths.
2. The Informed Party Actively Concealed Information
It frequently has been asserted that if the informed party takes
some affirmative steps to prevent detection of the truth by the uninformed party, then courts are more likely to require disclosure.
As one commentator states, “[c]oncealment involves some positive
action on the part of one to prevent the other from ascertaining
some material fact, which without the interference he would
probably have discovered.”92
For example, the seller of land might cover a landfill, ditch, or
other defect on the property with dirt and then fail to disclose this
information to prospective purchasers.93 Similarly, if the uninformed party inquires about certain facts, the informed party might
lead him (through words or actions) in a direction where the facts
cannot be found.94 We predicted that courts are more likely to require disclosure in such instances than in a case where the seller
had merely remained silent about some information, but had taken
no steps to prevent discovery by the purchaser.
F. Case Date
One of the goals of this study was to identify any historical patterns in the data. Specifically, the aim was to test the frequently repeated but never empirically tested hypothesis that the doctrine of
92

Wilson, supra note 30, at 233; see also Goldfarb, supra note 78, at 10 (distinguishing between “active concealment and mere nondisclosure”).
93
See Merchants Bank v. Campbell, 75 Va. 455, 460–61 (1881) (finding fraud where
defendants stopped up the entrance to a valuable cavern and told plaintiffs that it was
“nothing but a mud-hole”); Schneider v. Heath, (1813) 170 Eng. Rep. 1462, 1463
(K.B.) (finding fraud where defendants had removed a ship from the ways, where it
had been sitting dry, and docked it in the water so that the plaintiffs could not observe
defects on the bottom of the boat).
94
See, e.g., Stewart v. Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 383, 389 (1888) (finding fraud where defendant prevented plaintiff’s agent from making inquiries which
would have revealed material negative information); Chrisholm v. Gadsden, 1 S.C.L.
(1 Strob.) 220, 224 (1847) (finding fraud where, in response to the uninformed party’s
inquiries, the informed party sent him to inspect an area of property where he knew
the defect could not be discovered).
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caveat emptor had faded in importance over time and that, correspondingly, common-law disclosure duties had increased during
the time period of our study (approximately 1789 to May 15,
2002).95 It has been asserted, in particular, that the law governing
latent defects became more pro-disclosure in recent years.96
The most commonly asserted rationale for this perceived trend is
an economic one: As America was transformed from an agrarian
economy, in which people typically transacted primarily with persons whom they knew, to a commercial economy in which people
regularly transacted with complete strangers, the law became more
protective of the rights of uninformed parties in order to encourage
commerce.97 In other words, legal changes occurred in response to
economic changes.
We predicted, therefore, that the more recently a case was decided, the more likely a court would be to find that the informed
party owed the uninformed party a duty to disclose. In addition,
given Professor Kronman’s claim regarding the trend over time for
cases involving latent defects, we predicted that, for cases in which
the withheld information related to a latent defect, courts would be
more likely to find a duty to disclose during the period 1958
through 1983, as compared to the years before 1958.

95
See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 13, at 31 (“[I]t is of course apparent that the content
of the maxim ‘caveat emptor,’ used in its broader meaning of imposing risks on both
parties to a transaction, has been greatly limited since its origin.”); Kronman, supra
note 1, at 24; Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of
Contracts, 68 Va. L. Rev. 117, 133–34 (1982) (“Modern cases, however, can be read as
signaling a trend toward increased disclosure requirements.”). But see Dalley, Law of
Deceit, supra note 2, at 441 (finding that the law of deceit did not become more protective of the rights of uninformed parties from 1790–1860); Goldfarb, supra note 78,
at 9 (“Writers who believe that [caveat emptor] has lost much of its content seem to be
misreading the bulk of the decisions.”).
96
Kronman, supra note 1, at 24 (arguing that, in “the last twenty-five years,” disclosure duties regarding latent defects have increased dramatically).
97
Horwitz, supra note 17, at 198–201 (arguing that, as markets and commerce became depersonalized, courts shifted their focus toward requiring disclosure of information not available to both parties, in contrast to both the strict caveat emptor and
the fair price doctrines that had preceded it); see also Wahl, supra note 57, at 147
(“The doctrine of caveat emptor for sales replaced the sound-price rule (which presumed that any item sold at full price was sound) by the early 1800s and remained
strong through the early twentieth century.”).
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G. Court
1. Geographic Patterns
We also wanted to determine whether any geographical patterns
emerged in the cases. In particular, we wanted to test the assertion
by some legal and economic historians that southern states were
historically much less likely to impose disclosure duties on bargaining parties than were states in other regions.98
We predicted that courts in the South would be less likely to impose disclosure duties as compared to other regions during two
early periods: 1793–1860 and 1861–1940.99 In addition, we examined regional trends in a recent period, 1941–2002.
2. Differences Between Federal and State Courts
Although we are not aware of any assertions made by commentators that differences exist among the cases according to jurisdiction, we wanted to test for such differences, both between state and
federal courts, and among the federal circuit courts. Because commentators have not asserted that such differences exist, we predicted that neither the deciding court’s circuit nor the deciding
court’s nature as state or federal would have a significant influence
on the probability that a court would find a duty to disclose.
Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses discussed throughout this
Part. In addition, the table presents a summary of the basic results
obtained from our regression analyses, the details of which appear
in Part III.

98

See, e.g., Dalley, Law of Deceit, supra note 2, at 431–32 (studying cases decided
between 1790 and 1860 and claiming that cases in the South resulted in more proseller decisions than other regions).
99
These dates were chosen somewhat arbitrarily because those who made claims
about the South did not specify what they meant by “historically.” The dates we chose
correspond roughly with the end of the Civil War, which marks the last period of
Dalley’s dataset, and the beginning of World War II. Both events were highly significant for the South.
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Table 1
Summary of Hypotheses and Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Log odds of court finding a duty to disclose
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Type of Information:
Information was intrinsic
Undisclosed information concerned
personal intentions or opinions
Undisclosed information related to a
latent defect
Information concerned a defect likely to
cause bodily injury
Information concerned a defect likely to
cause property damage
Information would have updated or
corrected previously disclosed
information
Type of Transaction:
Parties to transaction in a confidential or
fiduciary relationship
Transaction concerned acquisition of
insurance
Transaction concerned release from
liability
Parties had unequal access to information
Transaction concerned the transfer of
real property
Transaction concerned the transfer of a
slave
Type of Acquisition:
Information was casually acquired
Information was acquired through illegal
or tortious means

PREDICTED SIGN
OF COEFFICIENT

REGRESSION
RESULTS

+ / NO EFFECT
—

NO EFFECT
— / NO EFFECT

+

+

+

NO EFFECT

+

NO EFFECT

+

+

+

+

+

NO EFFECT

+

NO EFFECT

+

+

+

+ / NO EFFECT

+

Perfect predictor**

+
+

+ / NO EFFECT
NO EFFECT
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Table 1 (continued):
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Uninformed Party Characteristics:
Uninformed party was the buyer or
lessee
Uninformed party was female
Uninformed party was sick, disabled,
illiterate or elderly
Informed Party Characteristics:
Informed party made affirmative
misrepresentations
Informed party concealed information
Informed party told a half-truth
Time Trends:
Year case was decided
Geographic Trends*:
Decision made by state court
Decision made by federal circuit court

PREDICTED SIGN
OF COEFFICIENT

REGRESSION
RESULTS

+

+

+
+

NO EFFECT
+

+

+

+
+

+
+

+

—

NO EFFECT
NO EFFECT

+ / NO EFFECT
3rd Cir: — / NO
EFFECT
6th Cir: —
7th Cir: —

*
The predictions and results pertaining to the effects of the regional location of the court are
provided in detail in Part III.
** This variable is dropped from all regressions because, in each of the three cases involving
slaves, the court found a duty to disclose.
TABLE 1: This table provides a summary of the hypotheses derived from the literature regarding the factors influencing courts to find a duty to disclose and results from regressions used to
test these hypotheses. Note that the table reports the results from all specifications. Indeterminate results indicate that the results are not robust to all specifications.
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II. DATA COLLECTION
A. The Available Cases
Like many other studies attempting to empirically examine case
law or judicial developments, this study is limited to the Westlaw
database, which does not include all decided cases.100 Instead, Westlaw excludes some unpublished cases, thus biasing the results to the
extent that there is some systematic difference between available
and unavailable cases. A description of West’s process for choosing
cases for inclusion in its database is contained in Appendix A.
In addition, this study accounts for neither the impact of settlement on the type of case that ultimately proceeds to the litigation
stage nor the impact of judicial statements of case facts on our assumptions regarding what occurred in any given transaction. As
argued by some commentators, judges may selectively repeat only
the information that they consider relevant, or may allow their own
biases to shape their interpretation and description of the facts of
the case.101 As noted, however, this is typical of all legal analyses
based on decided cases, including traditional doctrinal legal scholarship.
Given the inherent incompleteness of the Westlaw database, it is
reasonable to infer that we introduced selection biases into our
sample. While we acknowledge this, we do not think it limits the
usefulness of our results given the focus on our study—to test
commentators’ claims regarding the factors that drive courts to impose a duty to disclose information—because these claims are
based on the same set of cases from which we drew our sample.
100
A study seeking to examine the case law of a particular jurisdiction for a short
(and relatively modern) timeframe could examine all decided cases in some courts by
obtaining unpublished opinions either through Westlaw or Lexis, the individual
court’s website, the court clerk, or some other collection service. This step is impractical in a study such as ours, which attempts to analyze a sample of the entire set of federal and state cases. Furthermore, as discussed in Appendix A, early American cases
were often unreported, making any historical study of the common law incomplete.
101
See, e.g., Robert P. Burns, The Lawfulness of the American Trial, 38 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 205, 219 (2001) (“[L]awyers . . . often believe that the account of the facts
provided by appellate courts is deeply unfair.”); Anthony D’Amato, The Ultimate
Injustice: When a Court Misstates the Facts, 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 1313, 1325–31 (1990)
(describing Judge Easterbrook’s misstatement of the facts in the case of Branion v.
Gramly).
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B. The Collection Process
We ran our search on May 15, 2002, and retrieved cases in the
“Allcases-old” and “Allcases” databases on Westlaw. The search
retrieved 217 cases in the Allcases-old database, resulting in 152
observations.102 The search retrieved 1086 cases in the Allcases database, from which we drew a random sample resulting in 314 observations, for a total of 466 observations.103 Courts found a duty to
disclose in 51% of the cases in our sample.104
1. The Search Terms
The search terms we employed were: duty /3 disclos! /p fraud /p
(contract tort) % securities /3 act. Because we focused solely on
common-law (as opposed to statutory) duties to disclose, we purposely designed the search to exclude cases decided under the federal statutory securities laws; as a result, we also excluded cases
that might have referenced these securities laws in reaching a decision. Consequently, our dataset included only one case involving
fraudulent silence in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
2. Case Coding
Case coding was done by research assistants, with the supervision of one of the authors. Detailed information regarding this
process is contained in Appendix A.
Given our focus on common-law rules, cases decided under a
statute were especially difficult to code. Many states have attempted to codify or expand the law governing fraudulent nondis-

102
Some cases are not usable, either because the court failed to reach a decision on
the merits with respect to the element of duty, because the search terms identified a
case that does not actually address the question being studied, or because the court’s
decision did not reflect the common law because it was based on a statute or was impacted by a warranty or waiver. As a result, the number of observations is less than
the number of cases retrieved. See Appendix A for further explanation on this.
103
The complete dataset is available from the authors upon request.
104
Although this statistic is consistent with the predictions of the Priest-Klein model,
for reasons discussed infra notes 171–174 and accompanying text, we believe this statistic is anomalous and unrelated to the Priest-Klein model. See George L. Priest &
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1, 6 (1984).
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105

closure in particular areas, especially real estate sales, consumer
106
107
transactions of all types, car sales, and health care delivery. As
a result, some cases in these areas (especially more recent cases)
might be decided under a statute. We did not automatically exclude such cases from our dataset, however. Instead, when the
statute (or, where relevant, the legislative history) simply prohibited “fraud” without defining it (thus forcing courts to return to the
common law for a definition) or merely codified the common law,
we coded the case as if it had been decided under the common law.
Where the statute attempted to change or expand the common law,
however, or where the statute specifically imposed liability for a
failure to disclose (as is typical, for example, in some statutes governing real estate sales), we excluded the case.108
Finally, we directed the case coders to make an evaluation of the
variables in each case that was independent of the court’s evaluation of the variables. This method served three functions: first, and
most importantly, it was a necessary step to using all of the cases,
as only rarely did a court draw specific conclusions regarding every
variable that we desired to code; second, it allowed us to adopt
bright-line coding rules that reduced subjectivity and eliminated
the need to master the law across numerous time frames and jurisdictions; third, it allowed us to minimize the impact of conscious or
unconscious judicial mischaracterizations of fact. We discuss each
of these functions, in turn.

105

See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1102 (West 2005) (delineating the seller’s disclosure
obligations when transferring real property).
106
Elizabeth A. Dalberth, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in Real Estate
Transactions: The Duty to Disclose Off-Site Environmental Hazards, 97 Dick. L. Rev.
153, 157 (1992) (noting that, beginning in the mid-1960s and 1970s, states began to enact unfair and deceptive act and practices statutes to protect consumers in most transactions).
107
Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 Ariz. L.
Rev. 313, 334 n.115 (2002) (discussing informed consent statutes); Ryan Steven Johnson, Note, ERISA Doctor in the House? The Duty to Disclose Physician Incentives to
Limit Health Care, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 1631 (1998) (discussing disclosure duties imposed on various parties by ERISA).
108
A surprisingly large number of such cases, especially cases concerning real estate
sales, remain in our dataset. This is because many state statutes imposing liability for
a failure to disclose also permit an informed waiver of the statute’s protection. In
many of the real estate cases in our dataset, such a waiver was procured, leaving the
parties to rely on common-law remedies.
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First, if the court’s recitation of facts in a particular case did not
permit the coding of every variable, we excluded the case from the
dataset.109 However, when the recitation of facts contained sufficient information to code each variable, we retained the case and
coded for each variable, even if the court did not draw specific conclusions regarding each variable. To illustrate, we found that courts
rarely specifically concluded whether the parties had equal access
to information. However, the court’s recitation of facts generally
allowed the case coder to make such a conclusion. This allowed us
to test whether, as hypothesized by Professor Scheppele, equal access to information significantly influenced case outcomes, even
when the court purported to base its decision on other grounds
and, in fact, may not have discussed the parties’ relative access to
information at all.110
Second, because our study spans numerous time frames and jurisdictions, it was simply impractical to master the specifics of the
law with respect to each variable. This was especially true with respect to the fiduciary duty variable. Instead, we adopted bright-line
rules that reflected the general weight of authority across jurisdictions and did not apply the fiduciary duty rules specific to the jurisdiction deciding the case.111
Third, on rare occasions, the case coder may simply have disagreed with the court’s characterization of a particular variable. In
such cases, we directed the case coder to code the variable consistent with our definitions of each variable, rather than the court’s
conclusions. For example, even if a court concluded that a particular doctor-patient relationship was not confidential, our case coders
would have coded such a relationship as fiduciary or confidential,
because we adopted in advance a bright-line rule that all such relationships would be treated as confidential. Similarly, we directed
our case coders to apply the bright-line definition we developed
(based on Professor Kronman’s theories) for determining whether
information was casually acquired, regardless of whether the court
109

See Appendix, Section 2 (discussing the reasons that particular cases were excluded from the dataset).
110
See Scheppele, supra note 2, at 133 (arguing that the common-law rule holding
sellers to greater disclosure obligations than buyers is actually a rule of equal access
because buyers are unlikely to have access to information unavailable to the seller).
111
See supra Section I.B.1 (discussing the fiduciary duty variable).
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determined the information in question was casually acquired.112
This approach minimizes both subjectivity in coding and any judicial tendency to characterize variables in a manner that supports
the court’s ultimate ruling.113
C. Summary Statistics
Table 2 provides a short description of the variables related to
case characteristics and summary statistics for the entire sample,
for the sub-sample of cases requiring disclosure, and for the subsample of cases not requiring disclosure. Table 3 provides the same
information for variables related to decision date, geographic region, and jurisdiction.
III. RESULTS
The claims presented in Part I predict that the probability that a
court will find a duty to disclose depends, in part, on five groups of
factors: the type of information withheld by the informed party, the
type of transaction in which the parties engaged, the way in which
the information was acquired by the informed party, the characteristics of the uninformed party, and the behavior of the informed
party. In addition to these factors, we also investigate trends related to the decision date, geographic location of the court, and jurisdiction.
Our dependent variable—DISCLOSURE—is dichotomous;
therefore, linear regression models such as Ordinary Least Squares

112
See supra Section I.C.1 (discussing the definition of casually acquired information). It should be noted that, most often, the court either made no conclusion with
respect to this variable or made a conclusion consistent with our own. However, on
rare occasions when the court’s conclusion was inconsistent with our bright-line definition, the case coder was directed to ignore the court’s conclusion and apply our
definition.
113
Like all readers of judicial opinions, we are still limited by the court’s statement
of facts. Our objective approach frees us only from the court’s erroneous conclusions
regarding the facts, not from the statement of facts itself. See D’Amato, supra note
101 (arguing that courts sometimes purposely misstate facts). In other words, if a
court incorrectly reports that two bargaining parties were married, the case coders
would treat the relationship as confidential, even if the court’s reporting of this fact
was incorrect. In contrast, if the court correctly reported that the bargaining parties
were married but then concluded that the relationship was not confidential, our case
coders would disagree and treat the relationship as confidential.

2ND SUB_KRAWIECZEILERBOOK.DOC

2005]

11/17/2005 10:32:28 AM

Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission

1837

are not appropriate to perform estimations.114 Instead, we employ
logistic regressions to estimate the effects of our independent variables on the predicted log odds that a court will require disclosure.115 Using regression analysis to measure the effects of the independent variables on the predicted log odds that a court will
require disclosure allows us to draw inferences about which factors
significantly influence court decisions when other factors are taken
into account.

114
A dichotomous variable is one that can take on only one of two possible values.
The variable DISCLOSURE is coded either as a “0” or a “1” for each observation in
our sample.
115
The dependent variable is the predicted log odds that the event will occur, rather
than the probability that the event will occur, because the log odds form satisfies the
assumptions required to obtain valid regression results. The coefficients generated
when using this form as the dependent variable lack an intuitively meaningful scale of
interpretation, however. Thus, when interpreting the results in the text that follows,
we interpret a coefficient that is statistically significant and positive as indicating that
the presence of the associated independent variable leads to an increase in the likelihood that the court will require disclosure. See Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise &
Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study
of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1377, 1431–32 n.230 (1998) (explaining the
technical differences between Ordinary Least Squares and logit models). For an introduction to logistic regression methodology, see generally Fred C. Pampel, Logistic
Regression: A Primer (Sage Univ. Papers, Quantitative Applications in the Soc. Sciences Series No. 7-132, 2000).

2ND SUB_KRAWIECZEILERBOOK.DOC

1838

11/17/2005 10:32:28 AM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 91:1795

Table 2
Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics
Case Characteristics

VARIABLE

MEAN
FOR FULL
SAMPLE
(N = 466)

MEAN
FOR CASES
FINDING
DISCLOSURE
DUTY
(N = 237)

MEAN FOR
CASES
FINDING NO
DISCLOSURE
DUTY
(N = 229)

DEFINITION

Dependent Variable:
DISCL

0.51

(238)

1 = court imposed liability for
fraudulent silence

Type of Information:
INSTRINSIC

0.97

(452)

0.97

(230)

0.97

(222)

PERSONAL

0.09

(42)

0.05

(12)

0.13

(30)

LATENT

0.13

(60)

0.20

(48)

0.05

(12)

INJURE

0.03

(12)

0.03

(8)

0.02

(4)

DAMAGE

0.08

(36)

0.10

(23)

0.06

(13)

1 = information concerned a defect
likely to cause property damage

UP_CORR

0.13

(62)

0.17

(41)

0.09

(21)

1 = information would have
updated or corrected previously
disclosed information

Type of Transaction:
CONFID

0.28

(131)

0.43

(102)

0.13

(29)

INSURE

0.07

(32)

0.08

(20)

0.05

(12)

RELEASE

0.03

(15)

0.04

(9)

0.03

(6)

ACCESS

0.58

(268)

0.70

(165)

0.45

(103)

PROPERTY

0.34

(157)

0.41

(96)

0.27

(61)

SLAVE

0.01

(3)

0.01

(3)

0.00

(0)

1 = parties to transaction in a
confidential or fiduciary
relationship
1 = transaction concerned
acquisition of insurance
1 = transaction concerned release
from liability
1 = parties had unequal access to
information
1 = transaction concerned the
transfer of real property
1 = transaction concerned the
transfer of a slave

Type of Acquisition:
CASUAL

0.80

(371)

0.80

(190)

0.79

(181)

ILLEGAL

0.01

(4)

0.01

(3)

0.004

(1)

Independent Variables:

1 = information related to subject
matter of transaction
1 = information concerned
personal intentions or opinions
1 = information related to a latent
defect
1 = information concerned a defect
likely to cause bodily injury

1 = information was casually
acquired
1 = information was acquired
through illegal or tortious means
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Table 2 (continued)

VARIABLE

MEAN
FOR FULL
SAMPLE
(N = 466)

MEAN
FOR CASES
FINDING
DISCLOSURE
DUTY
(N = 237)

MEAN FOR
CASES
FINDING NO
DISCLOSURE
DUTY
(N = 229)

Uninformed Party Characteristics:
BUYER
0.40

(186)

0.46

(109)

0.34

(77)

FEMALE
SICK

0.12
0.06

(55)
(27)

0.14
0.08

(33)
(19)

0.10
0.03

(22)
(8)

Informed Party Characteristics:
LIED
0.20

(91)

0.35

(83)

0.03

(8)

CONCEAL

0.08

(36)

0.14

(33)

0.01

(3)

HALF_TRUTH

0.23

(106)

0.37

(87)

0.08

(19)

DEFINITION

1 = uninformed party was the
buyer or lessee
1 = uninformed party was female
1 = uninformed party was sick,
disabled, illiterate or elderly

1 = informed party made
affirmative misrepresentations
1 = informed party concealed
information
1 = informed party told a half-truth

TABLE 2: This table provides a summary of the variables representing case characteristics employed in the empirical analysis along with the mean and description of each variable. The entire
sample consists of 466 cases. The mean for each variable for the full sample can be interpreted as
the percentage of cases characterized by the variable. For example, a mean of 51% for
DISCLOSURE indicates that 51% of the cases held the informed party liable. The numbers in
the parentheses indicate the number of cases (that is, mean times total number of cases in the
sample).
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Table 3
Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics
Case Date, Geographic Region, and Jurisdiction

VARIABLE

MEAN
FOR FULL
SAMPLE
(N = 466)

MEAN
FOR CASES
FINDING
DISCLOSURE
DUTY
(N = 237)

MEAN FOR
CASES
FINDING NO
DISCLOSURE
DUTY
(N = 229)

DEFINITION

Additional Independent Variables:
YEAR

1961

1949

STATE

0.75 (348)

0.83

1973
(197)

0.66

year case was decided (range = [1793 , 2002])
(151)

1 = case was decided by a state court

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS
CIR1

0.02 (8)

0.01

(3)

0.02

(5)

1 = case was decided by the First Circuit

CIR2

0.05 (21)

0.02

(4)

0.07

(17)

1 = case was decided by the Second Circuit

CIR3

0.02 (10)

0.01

(2)

0.03

(8)

1 = case was decided by the Third Circuit

CIR4

0.02 (7)

0.02

(4)

0.01

(3)

1 = case was decided by the Fourth Circuit

CIR5

0.02 (7)

0.01

(2)

0.02

(5)

1 = case was decided by the Fifth Circuit

CIR6

0.02 (7)

0.004 (1)

0.03

(6)

1 = case was decided by the Sixth Circuit

CIR7

0.02 (7)

0.01

(2)

0.02

(5)

1 = case was decided by the Seventh Circuit

CIR8

0.03 (12)

0.02

(5)

0.03

(7)

1 = case was decided by the Eighth Circuit

CIR9

0.03 (14)

0.03

(8)

0.03

(6)

1 = case was decided by the Ninth Circuit

CIR10

0.02 (10)

0.02

(4)

0.03

(6)

1 = case was decided by the Tenth Circuit

(0)

0.03

(6)

CIR11

0.01 (6)

0.00

FEDCIR

0.002 (1)

0.004 (1)

0.000 (0)

1 = case was decided by the Federal Circuit

DCCIR

0.01 (3)

0.01

0.004 (1)

1 = case was decided by the D.C. Circuit

(2)

1 = case was decided by the Eleventh Circuit

GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS
WEST

0.14 (66)

0.16

(38)

0.12

(28)

1 = case was decided by a court in the West

SOUTH

0.25 (117)

0.23

(55)

0.27

(61)

1 = case was decided by a court in the South

MIDATLANTIC

0.23 (106)

0.24

(58)

0.21

(48)

1 = case was decided by a court in a Mid-Atlantic state

SOUTHWEST

0.08 (36)

0.08

(18)

0.08

(18)

1 = case was decided by a court in the Southwest

NEWENGLAND

0.07 (32)

0.06

(15)

0.07

(17)

1 = case was decided by a court in New England

MIDWEST

0.24 (110)

0.22

(53)

0.25

(57)

1 = case was decided by a court in the Midwest

TABLE 3: This table provides a summary of the variables representing case date, geographic
region and jurisdiction employed in the empirical analysis along with the mean and description
of each variable. The entire sample consists of 466 cases. The numbers in the parentheses indicate the number of cases (that is, mean times total number of cases in the sample).

Throughout this Part, it is important to note that all reported results are aggregate results and therefore do not reflect differences
across jurisdictions. In other words, a reported result that a particular variable (for example, PROPERTY) is insignificant could mean
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that the variable is truly an insignificant predictor of case outcomes
in all jurisdictions. At the same time, however, it is possible that
the variable’s effect on decisions is significant and positive in the
First Circuit, canceling out the fact that it is significant and negative in the Second Circuit. Similarly, a reported result that a particular variable (for example, ACCESS) is positive and significant
could mean that the variable is a significant predictor of case outcomes in all jurisdictions or only a few. Indeed, it is possible that
the variable’s effect is negative and slightly significant in only one
or a few jurisdictions, but is counteracted by the variable’s highly
significant positive impact in other jurisdictions. In other words,
this project is designed to study overall general trends in decisions
that correspond to claims made by legal scholars and economic historians regarding general trends and patterns in the law governing
fraudulent nondisclosure. We do not attempt to describe the law
for any particular jurisdiction.
Table 4 presents basic results for several logistic regression
analyses that test the influence of various sets of independent variables on the likelihood that a court will find that the informed
party owed a duty of disclosure to the uninformed party.116 Various
specifications were analyzed to test the robustness of the results
given the large number of independent variables included in the
model.117 The following Sections provide a variable-by-variable
analysis of the results derived from the regression analysis and
various statistical tests.

116
We also analyzed the data using probit analysis and obtained results that were
nearly identical to the results we obtained using logistic regression analysis. For an
explanation of how probit analysis differs from logistic regression analysis, see Pampel, supra note 115, at 54–68.
117
By “specification” we mean the construction of the empirical equation that we
estimate to generate results regarding how the independent variables affect the dependent variable. The process of specifying the model includes determining: (1) which
variables should be included in the model, (2) the functional form of the model, and
(3) the probabilistic assumptions made about the dependent variable, the independent variables, and the error term. A result is “robust” if it does not vary significantly
with the specification of the model.
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Table 4
Maximum-Likelihood Logit Estimation Results
Dependent Variable: Predicted log odds of court finding duty to disclose
COEFFICIENT
(P VALUE)

VARIABLE
Type of Information:
INTRINSIC

0.32
(0.57)

0.16
(0.86)

PERSONAL

- 0.93**
(0.01)

- 0.32
(0.56)

LATENT

1.77***
(0.00)

2.24***
(0.00)

INJURE

0.07
(0.92)

1.05
(0.20)

DAMAGE

- 0.63
(0.18)

- 0.23
(0.72)

UP_CORR

0.90***
(0.00)

1.06**
(0.01)

Type of Transaction:
CONFID

1.82***
(0.00)

2.65***
(0.00)

INSURE

0.14
(0.77)

- 0.13
(0.84)

RELEASE

0.53
(0.39)

0.51
(0.55)

ACCESS

1.19***
(0.00)

1.03***
(0.00)

PROPERTY

1.27***
(0.00)

0.29
(0.45)

Type of Acquisition:
CASUAL

0.09
(0.71)

0.76*
(0.06)

ILLEGAL

1.10
(0.34)

1.26
(0.46)

Uninformed Party Characteristics:
BUYER

0.54**
(0.01)

1.18***
(0.00)

FEMALE

0.28
(0.36)

0.04
(0.93)

SICK

0.85*
(0.06)

1.58**
(0.03)

Informed Party Characteristics:
LIED

2.93***
(0.00)

3.17***
(0.00)

CONCEAL

2.82***
(0.00)

3.15***
(0.00)

HALF_TRUTH

2.18***
(0.00)

2.81***
(0.00)
-4.41***

Constant
LR χ

2

-0.47

-1.60***

-0.04

-0.26**

-1.01***

(0.40)

(0.00)

(0.84)

(0.04)

(0.00)

(0.00)

42.22

109.37

1.12

13.50

178.01

310.58

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.57)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

Pseudo R

0.07

0.17

0.00

0.02

0.28

0.48

N

466

463

466

466

466

463

2

* p < 0.10
** p < 0 .05
*** p < 0 .01
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TABLE 4: This table provides the maximum-likelihood logit estimation results for the effects of
case characteristics on whether the court found a duty to disclose. These results do not include
the effects of the decision date or the geographic location and jurisdiction of the court. See Table
6 for results taking these characteristics into account.
2

Note: LR indicates the result from testing the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the model,
2
except the constant, equal zero. In addition, it should be noted that, although pseudo R statistics
provide a quick way to compare the fit of different models for the same dependent variable, they
2
lack the straightforward explained-variance interpretation of true R in OLS regressions.

A. The Type of Information
Recall that commentators have suggested that particular characteristics of the withheld information influence courts’ decisions in
fraudulent silence cases. These characteristics include whether the
information was intrinsic or extrinsic in nature, related to personal
intentions or opinions versus facts, related to latent or patent defects, concerned a defect likely to cause bodily injury or property
damage, and would have updated or corrected previously disclosed
information.118
1. Whether the information was intrinsic, as opposed to extrinsic or
market, information does not explain the variation in outcomes
because 97% of the cases in the sample involve intrinsic information
a. General Results
We hypothesized that cases involving intrinsic information are
more likely to result in a finding that the informed party owed a
disclosure duty to the uninformed party in early years, but that the
importance of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction disappears over
time.119
As the results displayed in Table 4 indicate, the coefficient on
INTRINSIC is not statistically different from zero (p > 0.10), indicating that the intrinsic nature of the information is not a factor
that helps to explain the variation in case outcomes.120 It should be
118

See supra Section I.A.
See supra Section I.A.1 (discussing assertions by courts and commentators regarding extrinsic information).
120
To test the statistical significance of any result, a test statistic is calculated (the
details of which are unimportant for purposes of this exposition). The p-value is interpreted as the probability of observing a test statistic as extreme or more extreme
than the computed test statistic assuming the null hypothesis is true (for example, the
119
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noted, however, that this result is driven by the fact that 97% of the
cases in the full sample involve intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, information.
Nonetheless, other statistical tests allow us to cast some doubt
on the conventional wisdom regarding the relative likelihood that
courts will require the disclosure of intrinsic information. Specifically, tests for the equality of proportions cast doubt on claims that
courts are more likely to require the disclosure of intrinsic information than extrinsic information. Of the 14 cases in our dataset involving extrinsic information, the court found the existence of a
duty to disclose in 6 of the cases (or 43%). On the other hand, 51%
of the cases (or 231 of 452) involving intrinsic information resulted
in a finding that the informed party owed the uninformed party a
duty to disclose. Our analysis thus reveals that courts are not statistically more likely to require the disclosure of intrinsic information
as opposed to extrinsic information (p = 0.28).
Moreover, an interesting question here is why so few cases involving extrinsic information result in judicial decisions. Apparently, cases involving extrinsic information are either more likely
to settle, or less likely to be brought by plaintiffs. One possible explanation is that plaintiffs are simply less likely to bring claims for
fraudulent silence when the withheld information is extrinsic,
rather than intrinsic. This conjecture is supported by two potential
explanations. First, it is possible that individuals are less likely to
possess extrinsic information unknown to their bargaining partners
as compared to intrinsic information. Second, the uninformed
party is unlikely to discover that the informed party knew of extrinsic information. For example, it is unlikely that a home buyer
would discover that the seller had access to nonpublic information
regarding the fact that a highway was going to be built across an
adjacent lot. By contrast, the uninformed party may be able to eascoefficient on INTRINSIC equals zero). “Extreme” means in the direction of the alternative hypothesis (for example, the coefficient on INTRINSIC is different from
zero). In this case, assuming the null hypothesis is true, the chance of observing a test
statistic as or more extreme than the computed test statistic is greater than 10%. This
means that, at a confidence level of 10%, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
coefficient is equal to zero. Customarily, in social science research, a null hypothesis is
rejected in favor of an alternative hypothesis if the p-value is less than 5% (in some
cases, a 10% cutoff is used). In all cases, we report the exact p-values derived from the
statistical tests, leaving readers to evaluate the strength of the evidence.
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ily surmise that someone selling a car that she has owned for many
years was aware that the engine fails to start in cold weather.
b. Interaction Effects
Recall from Part I that some commentators assert that some
other factor, rather than the intrinsic nature of the information, actually explains the variation in fraudulent silence cases. For example, Professor W. Page Keeton argues that, although courts require
the disclosure of intrinsic information more frequently than extrinsic information, it is really the lack of equal access to intrinsic information relative to extrinsic information that is driving case outcomes.121 Similarly, Keeton argues that the intrinsic/extrinsic
distinction fails to explain case outcomes when the uninformed
party is the purchaser, as opposed to the seller.122 Finally, Professor
Anthony Kronman asserts that it is really the fact that extrinsic information is typically deliberately acquired that drives case outcomes, rather than the mere fact that the information is extrinsic.123
To test these claims, we ran three separate regressions to determine if interaction effects are present between INTRINSIC and
the three variables ACCESS, CASUAL, and BUYER.124 The results suggest that there are no significant interaction effects between INTRINSIC and these three variables. This result, however,
is most likely due to the lack of variation in the INTRINSIC variable and the resulting collinearity125 between the interaction term
and the variables ACCESS, CASUAL, and BUYER.

121

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
123
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
124
By including interaction effects in the analysis, we are able to measure the
amount of change in the slope of the regression of the dependent variable, say Y, on
an independent variable, say X, when a second independent variable, say Z, changes
by one unit. A positive and significant coefficient on an interaction term, X * Z, implies that the higher the X, the greater the effect of Z on Y. Similarly, the higher the
Z, the greater the effect of X on Y.
125
Two variables are collinear if they are highly correlated. When two independent
variables are highly correlated, they both introduce essentially the same information
into the regression. This violates one of the necessary assumptions of the logit model.
In addition, collinearity in this case implies that the interaction term has very little
variation and, therefore, is not likely to be a significant factor in explaining the variation in outcomes.
122
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c. Time Trends
Recall that some commentators claim that courts, over time, put
less weight on whether the information is intrinsic or extrinsic, and
instead focus on other factors.126 To test claims about the influence
of intrinsic information over time, we tabulated the number of
cases that involved intrinsic information and in which the court
found a duty to disclose during three periods: 1793–1899, 1900–
1949, and 1950–2002.127 Table 5 presents the results from this tabulation.
Table 5
Tabulations for Cases Involving Intrinsic Information
COURT FOUND
DUTY TO
DISCLOSE

COURT FOUND NO
DUTY TO
DISCLOSE

1793–1899

33 (77%)

10 (23%)

1900–1949

72 (70%)

31 (30%)

1950–2002

126 (41%)

180 (59%)

PERIOD

TABLE 5: This table presents the results of tabulations of the number of cases involving intrinsic information by outcome for three periods: 1793–1899, 1900–1949, and 1950–2002.

Tests for the equality of proportions were performed to investigate the claim that, over time, courts place less emphasis on
whether the information was intrinsic or extrinsic.128 First, we tested
whether courts impose disclosure duties in a statistically signifi-

126

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
These periods were chosen arbitrarily. The results do not vary, however, if different periods are used to test the hypothesis.
128
In particular, we ran two-sample, one-sided tests on the equality of proportions
(calculated using the data from two distinct samples). These tests pit the null hypothesis of equal proportions against an alternative hypothesis that one proportion is statistically significantly greater than the other, controlling for sample size. If the null hypothesis is accepted over the alternative hypothesis, then one may conclude that the
difference in proportions is due to chance.
127

2ND SUB_KRAWIECZEILERBOOK.DOC

2005]

11/17/2005 10:32:28 AM

Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission

1847

cantly lower proportion of cases involving intrinsic information
during the period 1793–1899 than in the period 1900–1949. The result indicates that no statistically significant difference exists between the percentages (p = 0.20). However, the proportion of cases
involving intrinsic information in which the court found a duty to
disclose during the period 1900–1949 was statistically significantly
higher than the proportion of such cases during the period 1950–
2002 (p = 0.00). Therefore, the data do show some support for the
claim that factors other than whether the information was intrinsic
or extrinsic became more important to courts over time. This
alone, however, does not allow us to determine whether this trend
is due to the relatively greater emphasis courts place on the nature
of the information as intrinsic versus extrinsic, or the general decrease over time in the likelihood that courts will find a duty to disclose.129
2. Whether the information involves personal intentions or opinions,
as opposed to facts, does not explain the variation in case outcomes
because the number of cases involving such information is too small
to obtain useful results from regression analysis. Outcome counts,
however, cast doubt on the conventional wisdom relating to personal
intentions.
Recall that there is almost universal agreement among commentators that the disclosure of personal intentions or opinions is not
required by the common law.130 The results presented in Table 4
indicate that the coefficient on PERSONAL is significant and
negative (p = 0.01) when we control only for variables relating to
the type of information. When we control for all case characteris129
In theory, it is possible to control for the general trend over time and other influences on court decisions, by estimating the influence of intrinsic information over
time using a logistic regression that includes the twenty variables representing case
characteristics and YEAR, together with a term to capture the interaction of year and
intrinsic information (INTRINSIC * YEAR). The coefficient on the interaction term
would allow us to determine whether courts were more or less likely to require disclosure in cases involving intrinsic information in later years relative to earlier years. The
coefficient on the interaction term was not statistically significantly different from
zero (p = 0.67). Due to the lack of variation in the INTRINSIC variable, however, this
regression result does not provide us with any useful information. See supra note 120
and accompanying text (discussing problems arising from the fact that 97% of the
cases involve intrinsic information).
130
See supra Section I.A.2.
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tics, however, the coefficient loses significance.131 When all variables are included in the model, the coefficient on PERSONAL is
insignificant (p > 0.10), indicating that whether the information is a
personal opinion or intention versus a fact is not a factor that helps
to explain the variation in case outcomes. This result most likely is
driven by the fact that only 9% of the cases in the full sample involve personal intentions or opinions. The number of these sorts of
cases might be too small to accurately identify the effect of this
variable on the likelihood of mandated disclosure.
Nonetheless, simple outcome counts cast doubt on the conventional wisdom relating to the disclosure of personal intentions or
opinions. Recall that consensus on the theory that the common law
does not require the disclosure of personal intentions or opinions is
so widespread that we hypothesized, first, that very few such cases
are actually brought and, second, that when such cases do result in
a decision the court nearly always permits such information to be
withheld. While we note that simple counts do not control for the
effects of other variables of interest and therefore results obtained
from simple counts must be viewed with this limitation in mind, the
results of the outcome count do not support either prediction regarding personal intentions or opinions. Of the 466 cases in the
sample, 41 (or 9%) involve information that was personal in nature.132 In a substantial portion of these cases (12 of the 41), the
court ruled that the informed party had a duty to disclose the withheld opinion or intention. Given the strong agreement among

131

Adding controls allows us to determine whether an observed correlation between
a particular factor, such as whether the information involves personal intentions or
opinions, and the probability that the court imposes a duty to disclose might be attributable to some other factor that possibly is correlated with the variable
PERSONAL. For example, if a particular factor, such as whether the information is
intrinsic, increases the probability that the court will find a duty to disclose and this
factor is highly (but not perfectly) correlated with whether the information involves
personal intentions or opinions, then including the variable INTRINSIC in the regression allows it to untangle the influences of INTRINSIC AND PERSONAL on the
likelihood that the court will impose a disclosure duty.
132
We can rule out the possibility that the lack of cases is attributable to courts’ reluctance to impose liability for failure to disclose personal intentions or opinions in
early cases, causing plaintiffs to eventually abandon such claims. Cases involving personal intentions or opinions appeared in the dataset uniformly over time. The first
case of this sort was decided in 1852, five others were decided prior to 1950, and the
remaining cases were decided after 1950.
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commentators that the disclosure of opinions and personal intentions is not required, these results are surprising. We conclude that
even the limited number of cases in our dataset involving information of this type challenges the conventional wisdom regarding the
disclosure of opinions and intentions.
3. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the
withheld information relates to a latent defect.
We hypothesized that courts would be more likely to require
disclosure when the informed party withholds information relating
to a latent defect.133 The results presented in Table 4 support this
claim. The coefficient on LATENT is positive and highly significant (p = 0.00), even when we control for all variables relating to
case characteristics. The commentators appear to have correctly
argued that this factor significantly influences judicial decisions in
fraudulent silence cases.
4. Whether the undisclosed information would likely cause bodily
injury or property damage does not explain the variation in the case
outcomes, most likely because the number of cases involving such
information is too small to obtain useful results from regression
analysis. Outcome counts, however, suggest that our hypotheses
regarding information of this sort are not supported strongly by the
data.
We hypothesized that the withholding of information likely to
cause physical injury or property damage increases the likelihood
of court-mandated disclosure.134 We coded cases separately for information concerning a defect likely to cause bodily injury
(INJURE) and information concerning a defect likely to cause
property damage (DAMAGE). The results presented in Table 4
indicate that the coefficients on INJURE and DAMAGE are insignificant (p > 0.10 in all cases). We note, however, that very few
cases involving information of this sort were present in our dataset.
Only 3% of the cases included in the full sample involve information likely to cause bodily injury and 8% of the cases involve information likely to lead to property damage. Therefore, the num133
134

See supra Section I.A.3.
See supra Section I.A.4.
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ber of these sorts of cases might be too small to accurately identify
the effect of these variables on the likelihood of mandated disclosure.
Again we performed simple counts, the results of which shed
light on whether courts are more likely to require disclosure of information regarding defects likely to cause physical injury or property damage. The results do not support our hypothesis that courts
are more likely to require disclosure of this sort of information. Of
the 12 cases involving information likely to result in physical injury,
8 (or 67%) resulted in a finding that the informed party had a duty
to disclose, while 4 (or 33%) resulted in a finding that the informed
party did not have a duty to disclose. Likewise, in 64% of cases (or
23 of 36) involving information likely to result in property damage,
the court found a duty to disclose. On the other hand, courts required disclosure in about 50% (or 443 of 884) of cases not involving such information. While these results suggest that courts tend
to rule for the uninformed party more often when bodily injury or
property damage is involved, these case outcomes are not nearly as
striking as one might expect, given the statements of legal commentators.
As with the INTRINSIC variable, an interesting question here is
why so few decisions involve information that could prevent bodily
injury or property damage. One possibility is that these cases settle,
because the plaintiff (who, by definition, has suffered bodily injury
or property damage) seems sympathetic and the defendant’s behavior appears more egregious in comparison. In addition, it might
be that cases of this sort give rise to other claims, such as negligence, and lawyers representing injured parties simply might not
include additional claims for fraudulent silence. For example, a
manufacturer’s failure to disclose certain defects is actionable under state statutes related to products liability. Finally, it is possible
that failures to disclose information regarding defects likely to lead
to injuries or property damage simply occur with lower frequency
than nondisclosures of other types of information. Obviously, we
cannot test this conjecture using our data.

2ND SUB_KRAWIECZEILERBOOK.DOC

2005]

11/17/2005 10:32:28 AM

Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission

1851

5. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the
withheld information would have updated or corrected previously
disclosed information.
We hypothesized that courts would be more likely to require
disclosure when the undisclosed information would have updated
or corrected previously disclosed information.135 The results presented in Table 4 support this claim. The coefficient on UP_CORR
is positive and highly significant (p = 0.01) when we control for all
variables relating to case characteristics. In this case it appears that
the commentators have argued correctly that this factor significantly influences courts’ decisions in fraudulent silence cases.
B. The Type of Transaction
Recall that commentators have argued that the type of transaction in question influences courts’ decisions in fraudulent silence
cases. In particular, claims have been made that courts are more
likely to require disclosure in transactions between parties in a confidential or fiduciary relationship; transactions concerning the acquisition of insurance, surety, or a release from liability; transactions in which the parties have unequal access to information;
transactions concerning the transfer of real property; and transactions concerning the sale or transfer of a slave.136
1. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the
contracting parties are in a confidential or fiduciary relationship.
We hypothesized that courts would be more likely to require
disclosure when the contracting parties are in a confidential or fiduciary relationship.137 The results presented in Table 4 support this
claim. The coefficient on CONFID is positive and highly significant
(p = 0.00), even when we control for all variables relating to case
characteristics. In this case it appears that the commentators have
correctly argued that, when the parties are in a confidential or fiduciary relationship, courts are more likely to require disclosure.

135

See supra Section I.A.5.
See supra Section I.B.
137
See supra Section I.B.1.
136
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2. Whether the transaction concerned insurance or a release from
liability does not explain the variation in case outcomes, most likely
because the number of cases involving such a transaction is too
small to obtain useful results from regression analysis. Outcome
counts, however, suggest that our hypotheses regarding information
of this sort are not supported strongly by the data.
We hypothesized that decisions involving transactions related to
insurance, surety, or a release from liability were more likely to result in the imposition of disclosure duties.138 We coded
INSURANCE and RELEASE separately. Because only one case
in our sample involved surety, we coded it as an insurance case.
The independent variable INSURE therefore represents cases related to insurance and one case related to surety. RELEASE
represents cases related to releases from liability.
The results presented in Table 4 indicate that the coefficients on
INSURE and RELEASE are insignificant (p > 0.10 in all cases).
We note again, however, that there are very few decisions involving information of this sort. Only 7% of the cases included in the
full sample involve insurance transactions and only 3% of the cases
involve releases from liability. Therefore, the number of these sorts
of cases might be too small to accurately identify the effect of these
variables on the likelihood of mandated disclosure.
Again, we used simple outcome counts to determine whether
courts are more likely to require disclosure of information when
the transaction involves insurance or a release from liability. The
results do not support our hypothesis that courts are more likely to
require disclosure of this sort of information. Of the 32 cases involving insurance contracts, the court found a duty to disclose in 20
(or 63%). Likewise, courts found a duty to disclose in 9 of 15 cases
(or 60%) involving releases from liability. Therefore, while courts
tend to find a duty to disclose in a somewhat slight majority of
cases involving insurance or releases from liability, courts do not
force disclosure in an overwhelming number of such cases.
3. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the
transaction was one in which the parties had unequal access to
information. Our analysis, however, indicates that the presence of
138

See supra Section I.B.2.
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unequal access in combination with the casual acquisition of
information actually drives case outcomes.
Recall from Part I that one of the liveliest debates in this literature is whether unequal access to information has a significant influence on the probability that courts will require the disclosure of
material information.139 Of particular interest has been the debate
between proponents of the equal access theory and proponents of
the deliberately acquired information theory.140 The results reveal
that if the parties had unequal access to the undisclosed information, courts are more likely to find that the informed party had a
duty to disclose. The coefficient on ACCESS is positive and highly
significant (p = 0.00), even when we control for all variables relating to case characteristics.
To ensure fair testing of the equal access theory we ran two additional regressions. First, Professor Scheppele’s assertions about the
state of the law were published in 1988. Accordingly, if changes in
the law caused courts to decide fraudulent silence cases differently
after 1988, a regression on our full dataset might fail to support the
equal access theory, even if Scheppele’s assertions were correct
when made. To test this possibility, we ran a second regression using only cases decided from 1793 to 1987. Under this specification,
the coefficient on ACCESS remains positive and highly significant
(p = 0.008; n = 264).
Second, it is possible that Professor Scheppele actually was reporting a perceived trend in the law based on a reading of several
recent, important cases that she believed signaled a development in
existing law. If this is the case, then a regression on cases decided
up to the date of her statements would not pick up that trend, as
the small number of recent, important cases would be outweighed
by the larger number of older cases decided under the prior rule of
law. To test this possibility we ran a third regression using only
cases decided from 1989 to 2002. Under this specification, the coefficient on ACCESS is insignificant (p = 0.17; n = 190), indicating
139

See supra Section I.B.3.
Compare Scheppele, supra note 2, at 124 (arguing that outcomes in fraudulent
silence cases are best explained by the equal access theory), with Kronman, supra
note 1, at 2 (arguing that outcomes in fraudulent silence cases are best explained by
the fact that some information is casually acquired and some information is deliberately acquired).
140
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that, in later cases, unequal access to information is not a driving
force behind decisions on the duty element. Therefore, our data do
not support the possibility that Scheppele was reporting a perceived trend or change in the law.
Our results thus shed light on this long-standing debate and, at
least initially, lend some support to the proponents of the equal access theory. Particularly when viewed in light of the results on
cases involving casually acquired information,141 our analysis seems
to support the equal access proponents as opposed to those who
claim that judges primarily consider economic efficiency in deciding case outcomes.
Because Professor Scheppele relied on many of the same cases
employed by Professor Kronman to develop her theory, we
thought it probable that both unequal access and casually acquired
information were present in those cases requiring disclosure that
the two authors examined. In other words, we surmised that both
Kronman and Scheppele may have looked at a particular set of
cases in which disclosure was required, the information was casually acquired, and the parties had unequal access. Whereas Kronman concluded that the casually acquired nature of the information
drove case outcomes, Scheppele concluded that it was the unequal
access of the parties that affected case outcomes. In contrast, we
hypothesized that perhaps it is the presence of unequal access and
casually acquired information together, rather than either factor
separately, that actually drives case outcomes.
To test this claim, we used a logistic regression and included all
twenty variables representing case characteristics and an interaction term, CASUAL * ACCESS.142 When we include this interaction term, we find that the coefficient on the interaction term is statistically significant and positive (p = 0.04). At the same time, the

141

See infra Section III.C.
The variable ACCESS and the interaction term (CASUAL * ACCESS) are
strongly positively correlated (r = 0.80). Therefore, we checked for problems related
to multicollinearity. When we regress ACCESS on all the other independent variables
and CASUAL * ACCESS, the tolerance is equal to 0.19. This means that 19% of the
variation in the ACCESS variable is not explained by the other independent variables. We get a similar measure of tolerance when we regress the interaction term on
all the independent variables. Tolerances of 5% or less are cause for concern. Thus,
we are confident that our results are not significantly affected by multicollinearity.
142
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coefficients on CASUAL and ACCESS both become insignificant
(p = 0.86 and p = 0.72, respectively).
These results suggest that courts are more likely to find a duty to
disclose when both of these factors are present, but not when either is present alone. Accordingly, our analysis indicates that each
side of this heated debate is both right and wrong at the same time.
Although whether the parties to the transaction had equal access
to information and whether the informed party casually acquired
the information both impact the probability that a court will mandate disclosure, as suggested by participants in the debate, only the
presence of both factors together significantly impacts case outcomes.
4. Whether the transaction involved the transfer of real property does
not explain the variation in case outcomes when we control for all
case characteristics.
As we discussed in Part I, some commentators claim that courts
are more likely to require disclosure when the transaction involves
the transfer of real property.143 The results presented in Table 4 indicate that the coefficient on PROPERTY is highly significant and
positive (p = 0.00) when we control only for variables relating to
the type of transaction. When we control for all case characteristics, however, the coefficient loses significance. When all variables
related to case characteristics are included in the model the coefficient on PROPERTY becomes insignificant (p > 0.10), indicating
that courts’ decisions in cases involving the transfer of real property are actually driven by other variables that are present in these
sorts of cases.
To test the most obvious potential variables driving the real
property cases, we ran two logistic regressions that included all
twenty variables related to case characteristics and an interaction term for either PROPERTY * LATENT or PROPERTY *
BUYER. In both cases, the interaction term was insignificant,
meaning that neither LATENT nor BUYER drives the outcomes
in property cases. Additional research is required to understand
the interactions between PROPERTY and the other variables.

143

See supra Section I.B.4.
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5. Three cases involving the sale or transfer of a slave appear in the
dataset, and in each case the court found that the informed party had
a duty to disclose. We dropped the variable SLAVE from the
regression analysis because it is a perfect predictor of case outcome.
Although we predicted in Part I that courts are more likely to
impose disclosure duties in cases involving the sale or transfer of a
slave,144 we were not able to test this claim using regression analysis
to control for the effects of other case characteristics because
SLAVE is a perfect predictor of whether the court required disclosure. In all three cases involving the sale or transfer of a slave, the
court held that the informed party had a duty to disclose. Therefore, although only three cases in our sample involve the sale or
transfer of a slave, the fact that all three require disclosure is at
least consistent with claims by some commentators that courts vigilantly police such transactions.
C. How the Information Was Acquired
As discussed in Part I, commentators also argue that the method
the informed party used to acquire the undisclosed information influences the likelihood that courts will impose a duty to disclose on
parties to a transaction. In particular, commentators have argued
that courts more frequently require the disclosure of casually acquired information and information acquired through illegal or tortious means.145
1. The results provide very weak support, if any, for the claim that
courts are more likely to require the disclosure of casually, as
opposed to deliberately, acquired information. Our analysis,
however, indicates that, if the parties lacked equal access to the
information and the information was acquired casually, courts are
more likely to require disclosure.146
a. General Results
Recall from Part I that Professor Kronman contends that courts
hesitate to require the disclosure of information deliberately ac144

See supra Section I.B.5.
See supra Section I.C.
146
See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing the interaction of
ACCESS with CASUAL).
145
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quired by the informed party.147 We predicted that, although distinguishing between deliberately acquired and casually acquired information is difficult in practice, the presence of this factor influences courts to find a duty to disclose in fraudulent silence cases.
The results presented in Table 4 are mixed on this factor. When
we control only for factors relating to how the information was acquired, the coefficient on CASUAL is insignificant (p = 0.71).
When we control for all case characteristics, however, the coefficient becomes positive and weakly significant (p = 0.06), suggesting
that courts might be more likely to require disclosure when the information is casually acquired as opposed to deliberately acquired.
It is important to note here that the result related to this variable
is not robust to other specifications that include variables for the
year in which the case was decided, the geographic region in which
the court sits, and the jurisdiction of the court.148 As presented in
Table 6, when we control for the case characteristics and (1) the
decision year, or (2) the geographic region, or (3) whether the
court is a state or federal court, the coefficient on CASUAL remains positive and weakly significant (0.10 > p > 0.05). When we
control for (1) the case characteristics together with the circuit in
which the court sits, or (2) all independent variables that we coded,
however, the coefficient on CASUAL becomes insignificant
(p > 0.10). These results indicate that the explanatory power of
CASUAL is not robust to changes in the specification, which suggests that any possible influence of CASUAL on the likelihood
that the court will impose a duty to disclose is weak at best.
To ensure a fair test of Professor Kronman’s claims, we ran two
additional regressions. First, Kronman developed his theory based
on an examination of the law in 1978. As a result, if a change in the
law of fraudulent silence caused courts to decide cases differently
after 1978, then a regression on the full dataset could unfairly reject Kronman’s hypothesis. Accordingly, we ran a second regression using only cases decided prior to the publication of his theory,

147

See supra notes 65–75 and accompanying text (discussing the Kronman theory).
As previously noted, Professor Kronman limits his claims to socially productive information, a distinction that we find irrelevant for the purposes of this study. See supra note 65 (discussing this fact).
148
General results for specifications including these additional variables are presented infra in Sections III.F and III.G.
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Table 6
Maximum-Likelihood Logit Estimation Results Including Year, Region, and Jurisdiction
Dependent Variable: Predicted Log Odds of Court Finding Duty to Disclose
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Type of Information:
INTRINSIC
PERSONAL
LATENT
INJURE
DAMAGE
UP_CORR
Type of Transaction:

CONFID
INSURE
RELEASE
ACCESS
PROPERTY

Type of Acquisition:

CASUAL

Uninformed
Party
Characteristics:

BUYER

Informed
Party
Characteristics:

LIED

ILLEGAL

FEMALE
SICK

CONCEAL
HALF_TRUTH

Time Trend:

YEAR

Geographic Region:

WEST

0.16
(0.86)
- 0.32
(0.56)
2.24***
(0.00)
1.05
(0.20)
- 0.23
(0.72)
1.06**
(0.01)
2.65***
(0.00)
- 0.13
(0.84)
0.51
(0.55)
1.03***
(0.00)
0.29
(0.45)
0.76*
(0.06)
1.26
(0.46)
1.18***
(0.00)
0.04
(0.93)
1.58**
(0.03)
3.17***
(0.00)
3.15***
(0.00)
2.81***
(0.00)

0.49
(0.60)
- 0.22
(0.69)
2.09***
(0.00)
0.93
(0.27)
0.03
(0.97)
1.12**
(0.01)
2.42***
(0.00)
- 0.24
(0.71)
0.47
(0.57)
1.05***
(0.00)
0.26
(0.50)
0.72*
(0.07)
0.99
(0.55)
1.25***
(0.00)
0.03
(0.94)
1.42*
(0.05)
3.17***
(0.00)
3.32***
(0.00)
2.69***
(0.00)
- 0.01**
(0.01)

MID-ATLANTIC
SOUTHWEST
NEW ENGLAND
STATE

0.75**
(0.04)

3RD CIRCUIT

-4.41***
(0.00)

13.55*
(0.06)

-5.03***
(0.00)

-4.84***
(0.00)

310.58

317.23

321.20

314.91

325.54

337.22

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.48
463

0.49
463

0.50
463

0.49
463

0.52
456

0.53
456

6TH CIRCUIT

Controls for all circuits included †
Constant
2

2

Pseudo R
N

0.13
(0.99)
- 0.29
(0.63)
2.27***
(0.00)
1.27
(0.19)
- 0.14
(0.84)
1.29**
(0.01)
2.70***
(0.00)
- 0.23
(0.75)
0.35
(0.70)
1.20***
(0.00)
- 0.04
(0.92)
0.52
(0.23)
0.16
(0.93)
1.72***
(0.00)
0.17
(0.74)
1.56*
(0.06)
3.52***
(0.00)
3.65***
(0.00)
2.88***
(0.00)
- 0.01*
(0.08)
0.45
(0.42)
0.20
(0.69)
0.97*
(0.07)
1.22*
(0.07)
0.58
(0.37)
- 1.39
(0.28)
- 2.86*
(0.08)
- 4.70**
(0.02)
- 3.74**
(0.05)
YES
11.09
(0.19)

- 1.20
(0.26)
- 3.20**
(0.02)
- 2.90**
(0.02)
YES
-3.86***
(0.00)

7TH CIRCUIT

LR χ

- 0.23
(0.82)
- 0.35
(0.56)
2.34***
(0.00)
1.41
(0.13)
- 0.29
(0.68)
1.26**
(0.01)
2.68***
(0.00)
- 0.21
(0.76)
0.36
(0.68)
1.24***
(0.00)
- 0.13
(0.76)
0.53
(0.21)
0.84
(0.66)
1.53***
(0.00)
- 0.02
(0.97)
1.72**
(0.03)
3.49***
(0.00)
3.44***
(0.00)
2.91***
(0.00)

0.68
(0.17)
0.19
(0.67)
1.13**
(0.01)
1.35**
(0.03)
0.67
(0.26)

SOUTH

Jurisdiction:

COEFFICIENT
(P VALUE)
- 0.04
0.12
(0.96)
(0.90)
- 0.30
- 0.18
(0.60)
(0.76)
2.37***
2.23***
(0.00)
(0.00)
1.16
1.28
(0.17)
(0.13)
- 0.27
- 0.16
(0.69)
(0.81)
1.13**
1.14**
(0.01)
(0.01)
2.84***
2.50***
(0.00)
(0.00)
- 0.01
- 0.11
(0.99)
(0.86)
0.51
0.38
(0.58)
(0.65)
1.03***
1.11***
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.33
0.12
(0.40)
(0.77)
0.81*
0.67*
(0.05)
(0.09)
0.75
1.26
(0.66)
(0.44)
1.33***
1.20***
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.20
- 0.04
(0.67)
(0.93)
1.66**
1.58**
(0.03)
(0.03)
3.22***
3.23***
(0.00)
(0.00)
3.31***
3.27***
(0.00)
(0.00)
2.87***
2.73***
(0.00)
(0.00)

* p < 0.10; ** p <0.05; *** p < 0.01
† Only those circuits for which results are statistically significant at the 10% level appear in the table.
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TABLE 6: This table provides the maximum-likelihood logit estimation results for the effects of
case characteristics, including the decision date, geographic location of the court (Midwest used
as base) and jurisdiction of the court, on whether the court found a duty to disclose.
Note: LR χ2 indicates the result from testing the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the
2
model, except the constant, equal zero. In addition, it should be noted that, although pseudo R
statistics provide a quick way to compare the fit of different models for the same dependent
2
variable, they lack the straightforward explained-variance interpretation of true R in OLS regression.

from 1793 to 1977. In this specification, which controls only for the
case characteristics and not year of decision, jurisdiction, or geographic region, the coefficient on CASUAL remains positive and
weakly significant (p = 0.08; n = 204).
Second, Professor Kronman actually may have been reporting a
perceived trend or change in the law based on the outcomes of a
few recently decided, important cases that he believed signaled a
change in existing law. If this is true, then a regression on cases decided up to the time Kronman made his statements would not pick
up this trend, because the many older cases following the prior rule
of law would obscure the impact of the more recent, important
cases asserting a new rule of law. To test this possibility, we ran a
regression using only cases decided after the publication of his theory, from 1979 to 2002. In this specification, again controlling only
for case characteristics, the coefficient on CASUAL becomes insignificant (p = 0.22; n = 255), indicating that whether the information was casually, rather than deliberately, acquired has no signifi
cant influence on whether the court finds a duty to disclose in the
later cases. Therefore, our data do not support the claim that
Kronman was reporting a perceived trend or change in the law.
b. Assumptions Regarding the Means of Information Acquisition
Recall that Professor Kronman contends that, because it is inefficient for courts to make case-by-case determinations of whether
information is casually or deliberately acquired, courts instead lay
down blanket rules about what class of case is most likely to involve deliberately or casually acquired information. In contrast, we
coded cases on an individual basis by analyzing the specific facts of
each case. Accordingly, our study was not designed to test precisely
Kronman’s hypothesis.

2ND SUB_KRAWIECZEILERBOOK.DOC

1860

11/17/2005 10:32:28 AM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 91:1795

Nonetheless, coding in this manner allows us to test whether
Professor Kronman was correct in his assumptions about how certain types of information are normally acquired. Recall, for example, Kronman’s assertion that whether information is extrinsic or
intrinsic appears to be relevant to court decisions only because extrinsic information is typically deliberately acquired, and courts are
concerned with protecting parties who have deliberately acquired
their information.149 To test the claim that extrinsic information is
typically deliberately acquired we performed simple counts. Of the
14 cases in our dataset that involve extrinsic information, 8 (or
57%) involve information that was casually acquired. Although
this relies upon a very small sample size, this result contradicts
Kronman’s characterization of the typical method of acquiring extrinsic information.
Similarly, Professor Kronman asserts that whether the transaction concerned the transfer of real property appears to be relevant
to courts only because information relevant to the transfer of real
property is typically casually acquired, and courts are more likely
to require the disclosure of casually acquired information. To test
the claim that information relevant to the transfer of real property
is typically casually acquired, we performed simple counts. Of the
157 cases in our dataset that involve information concerning the
transfer of real property, 124 (or 79%) involve casually acquired
information. In this instance, Kronman’s hypothesis about the
manner of information acquisition appears largely correct.
Finally, Professor Kronman argues that whether a defect is latent or patent appears to drive case outcomes only because information concerning a latent defect is typically casually acquired, and
courts require the disclosure of casually acquired information. To
test the claim that information concerning a latent defect is typically acquired casually, we performed simple counts. Of the 60
cases in our dataset that involve information concerning a latent
defect, 54 (or 90%) involved casually acquired information. In this
instance, again, Kronman’s prediction about the method by which
such information is acquired seems accurate.
Of course, these results do not take into account cases that are
not ultimately decided by the court, and there is reason to believe
149

See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text.
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that claims that settle or are never filed are different in important
ways from claims that result in decisions. Without access to this information, we are not able to adequately evaluate Professor
Kronman’s claims about the likely means of information acquisition in all cases.
2. Whether the information was acquired through illegal or tortious
means does not explain the variation in case outcomes because the
number of cases involving such information is too small to obtain
useful results from regression analysis. Outcome counts provide
limited support for the hypothesis that courts are more likely to
impose disclosure duties on contracting parties when the
information is acquired through illegal or tortious means.
We hypothesized that courts are more likely to hold that the informed party owes the uninformed party a duty to disclose when
the informed party acquires information using illegal or tortious
means.150 The results presented in Table 4 demonstrate that the coefficient on ILLEGAL is insignificant (p > 0.10), indicating that
this factor does not help to explain the variation in case outcomes.
This result is most likely driven by the fact that only 1% of the
cases in the full sample involve information of this sort. The number of these sorts of cases might be too small to accurately identify
the effect of this variable on the likelihood of mandated disclosure.
Nonetheless, simple outcome counts provide weak support for
our hypothesis relating to the disclosure of illegally acquired information. Of the 4 cases in the sample involving information acquired illegally or tortiously, 3 cases (or 75%) resulted in the imposition of liability for fraudulent silence. The results of the outcome
count thus provide some support for the claim that courts are more
likely to impose a duty to disclose on the informed party when the
withheld information is acquired illegally or tortiously, although
the support is weak given that our sample includes a very small
number of such cases.
As with the other independent variables that appear in relatively
few cases, a relevant question is why so few cases involving information acquired by illegal or tortious means result in decisions.
One possibility is that such cases settle early because the defendant
150

See supra Section I.C.2.
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is unsympathetic (having violated the law or committed a tort).
Accordingly, such defendants might fear that courts will treat them
more harshly, and would prefer to avoid the costs and potential
bad publicity associated with litigation. If true, this fear regarding
the impact of the informed party’s behavior on the case outcome is
consistent with our findings regarding court decisions when the informed party has engaged in other types of bad behavior, such as
concealing information, lying, or telling a half-truth.151
D. Characteristics of the Uninformed Party
As discussed in Part I, we hypothesized that court decisions are
influenced by particular characteristics of the uninformed party, including whether the uninformed party is a buyer or lessee; is female; or is sick, disabled, illiterate, elderly, or otherwise severely
disadvantaged in the bargaining relationship, although still competent to contract.152
1. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the
uninformed party is the buyer or lessee.
We hypothesized that courts would be more likely to require
disclosure when the uninformed party is the buyer or lessee, as opposed to the seller.153 The results presented in Table 4 support this
claim. The coefficient on BUYER is positive and highly significant
(p ≤ 0.01), even when we control for all variables relating to case
characteristics. In this case, it appears that the commentators have
argued correctly that courts impose higher disclosure duties on
sellers than on purchasers.

151

See infra Section III.E (discussing the impact of the informed party’s behavior on
case outcomes).
152
See supra Section I.D.
153
See supra Section I.D.1.
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2. Whether the uninformed party was female does not seem to be a
factor that influences courts’ decisions regarding fraudulent silence.
However, the percentage of cases in which the uninformed party is
female and disclosure is required decreased significantly from the
period 1793–1950 to the period 1951–2002.154
As discussed in Part I, we hypothesized that a duty to disclose information is more likely to be found when the uninformed party is
female, especially in older cases. The results presented in Table 4,
however, indicate that the coefficient on FEMALE is insignificant
(p > 0.10) in all specifications. These results suggest that courts are
not significantly influenced by the gender of the uninformed party
when determining the disclosure duties of bargaining parties.
To test whether courts’ positions with respect to the level of disclosure required by the informed party when the uninformed party
is female changed over time, we performed simple counts. Prior to
1950, 24 cases involved an uninformed party who was female, and
20 cases (or 83%) required disclosure. In contrast, in the period
from 1950 to May 15, 2002, 31 cases involved an uninformed party
who was female and 13 cases (or 42%) required disclosure. A test
of the equality of proportions indicates that this difference is statistically significant (p = 0.001). Although, when we control for all
other variables relating to case characteristics, FEMALE does not
seem to influence court decisions, we do find that in cases in which
the uninformed party is female, courts were much more likely to
require disclosure in cases decided prior to 1950 than in post-1950
cases.

154
We chose to divide the dataset into these time periods for specific reasons, including that the split resulted in roughly equal sample sizes of cases involving uninformed
females, and that public perceptions regarding the competence of women involved in
commercial and business transactions may have begun to change during this postWorld War II era.
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3. Courts are statistically significantly more likely to require
disclosure when the uninformed party was sick, disabled, illiterate,
or elderly, though competent to contract, although the statistical
significance of the influence of this variable varies with the
specification of the statistical model.
As discussed in Part I, we hypothesized that courts express sympathy for uninformed parties who are sick, disabled, illiterate or
elderly, though still competent to contract, by being more likely to
rule in their favor because of these factors.155 The results presented
in Table 4 support this claim. The coefficient on SICK is positive
and significant (p ≤ 0.10) in all specifications. Note, however, that
the significance of the coefficient varies with the specification; in
some cases the coefficient is statistically significant at only the 10%
level (for example, Table 6 indicates a p-value of 0.06 when we
control for all case characteristics, case decision year, geographic
region and jurisdiction). Although the evidence is weak for some
specifications of the empirical model, our intuition that when the
uninformed party is sympathetic in these particular ways courts are
more likely to require disclosure appears to have been correct.
E. Behavior of the Informed Party
As discussed in Part I, we hypothesized that courts consider the
general behavior of the informed party when deciding the extent to
which secret information must be disclosed to the uninformed
party. Specifically, we predicted that when the informed party
made affirmative misrepresentations or told half-truths in the same
transaction in which the alleged omission occurred and when the
informed party actively concealed information, courts are more
likely to find a duty to disclose.156
1. Courts are more likely to require disclosure if the court finds that
the informed party made affirmative misrepresentations or told halftruths in the same transaction in which the alleged omission
occurred.
In Part I, we predicted that courts’ decisions regarding whether
material information must be revealed to the uninformed party are
155
156

See supra Section I.D.3.
See supra Section I.E.
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influenced by the general behavior of the informed party.157 Specifically, if the informed party was found to have made an affirmative misrepresentation or told a half-truth to the uninformed party
in the same transaction in which the alleged omission occurred, we
hypothesized that the court would be more likely to rule against
the informed party in the separate fraudulent silence claim. The results presented in Table 4 support both of these claims. The coefficients on LIED and HALF-TRUTH are positive and highly significant (p = 0.00). When we control for the case decision year, the
geographic region, and the jurisdiction of the court, the coefficients
remain positive and highly significant (p = 0.00). Therefore, the
data provide strong support for the prediction that the general bad
behavior of the informed party influences courts.
2. A court is more likely to find a duty to disclose if it finds that the
informed party actively concealed the withheld information.
As discussed in Part I, we also hypothesized that another form of
bad behavior on the part of the defendant—the active concealment
of information—increases the probability that the court will require disclosure.158 The results presented in Table 4 support this
claim. The coefficient on CONCEAL is positive and highly significant (p = 0.00). When we control for the case decision year and the
geographic region and jurisdiction of the court, the coefficient remains positive and highly significant (p = 0.00). Therefore, the data
provide strong support for the claim that actions taken by the informed party to conceal information influence courts’ decisions regarding the imposition of disclosure duties. When taken together
with the findings on LIED and HALF-TRUTH discussed in Section III.E.1. above, the data strongly support the theory that courts
account for the informed party’s behavior in determining whether
a duty to disclose existed.
F. Case Date
Recall from Part I that many commentators argue that courts
have become more pro-disclosure during the time period over

157
158

See supra Section I.E.1.
See supra Section I.E.2.

2ND SUB_KRAWIECZEILERBOOK.DOC

1866

11/17/2005 10:32:28 AM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 91:1795

which our data span. In addition, some commentators make more
specific claims about changes in the doctrine or application of the
doctrine over time.159 In this Section we investigate these claims
about trends over time and discuss some interesting patterns in the
data revealed by our study.
1. Basic regression analyses do not support the claim that courts
have become more likely to require the disclosure of material
information over time.
Table 6 presents results from tests of the influence of the case
decision date on the likelihood that the court will rule that the informed party had a duty to disclose the withheld information to the
uninformed party.160
The results related to the general trend over time are striking.
First, while most commentators claim that courts are more likely to
require disclosure in more recent cases, results generated by the
logistic regression analysis reported in Table 6 suggest that courts
are less likely to mandate disclosure in recently decided cases.
When we control for all twenty case characteristics, the coefficient
on YEAR is negative and statistically significant (p = 0.01), indicating that, over time, courts have become less likely to find a duty to
disclose. To test the robustness of this result, we added controls for
geographic region and jurisdiction of the court.161 Although the coefficient loses some of its significance, it remains negative and
weakly statistically significant (p = 0.08).
Although these results provide support for the claim that courts
have become less likely over time to require the disclosure of material information, testing the claim using regression analysis does
not allow us to determine whether this development progresses in
159

See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
We also analyzed the data using probit analysis and obtained results that were
nearly identical to the results we obtained using logistic regression analysis.
161
Adding controls allows us to determine whether the relationship between year
and the probability that the court imposes a duty to disclose suggested by the initial
regression might be attributable to some other variable (for example, geographic region or jurisdiction) that possibly is correlated with year. For example, if a particular
jurisdiction is less likely than other jurisdictions to find a duty to disclose and this jurisdiction produces a larger portion of reported case outcomes over time, then by controlling for jurisdiction the regression is able to untangle the influences of jurisdiction
and year of decision on the likelihood that the court will impose a disclosure duty.
160
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a linear fashion or is more complicated, with spikes and valleys
during particular time periods. To investigate this possibility, we
employed more nuanced statistical tests and constructed timeseries graphs.
2. Simple tabulation results do not support the claim that courts have
been more likely to require disclosure in cases decided in later years.
We employed simple tabulations, the results of which are reported in Table 7, to check for differences between particular time
periods using the entire sample.
Table 7
Tabulations for Cases over Various Periods
COURT FOUND
DUTY TO
DISCLOSE

COURT FOUND NO
DUTY TO
DISCLOSE

1793–1860

10 (67%)

5 (33%)

1861–1940

89 (71%)

37 (29%)

1941–2002

138 (42%)

187 (58%)

PERIOD

TABLE 7: This table presents the results of tabulations of the number of cases by outcome for
three periods: 1793–1860, 1861–1940 and 1941–2002. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.

We found that, prior to 1860, courts found a duty to disclose in
10 of 15 cases (or 67%). Between 1861 and 1940, the years roughly
between the Civil War and the start of World War II, courts found
a duty to disclose in 89 of 126 cases (or 71%). Finally, between
1941 and 2002, courts found a duty to disclose in 138 of 325 cases
(or 42%). A test for the equality of proportions calculated for the
first two periods indicates that no statistically significant difference
exists between the proportions (p = 0.62). The difference between
the proportions calculated for the period 1861–1940 and 1941–
2002, however, is statistically significant (p = 0.00). These results do
not support claims about an increase in the likelihood that courts
will require disclosure due to the shift from an agrarian to a commercial economy. In fact, the data indicates the opposite—courts
have been less likely to require the disclosure of material informa-
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tion from World War II to the present than they were during the
period from the Civil War until World War II.
3. A time-series graph of the dependent variable does not support the
claim that courts have been more likely over time to require
informed parties to disclose information to uninformed parties, but
reveals an interesting pattern when compared to a time series graph
of the number of fraudulent silence decisions across time.
To better understand the pattern of court decisions over time,
we graphed the proportion of fraudulent silence cases in which the
court found that the informed party owed the uninformed party a
duty to disclose (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Proportion of Cases in Which the Court
Found a Duty to Disclose by Year
The graph reveals that the proportion of cases in which the court
imposed a duty of disclosure on the informed party decreased almost linearly over time, especially in the years after 1970—the
years in which most of the cases in our dataset were decided. This
observation further supports the findings obtained from the regression analyses. Given the pattern in the dependent variable over
time revealed in Figure 1, it is unlikely that a non-linear relation-
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ship between time and the probability of the court requiring disclosure exists.
It is also interesting to note that the number of decisions involving the issue of whether the informed party owed a duty of disclosure significantly increased over time, again especially in the years
after 1970. Figure 2 presents a graph of the number of fraudulent
silence decisions by five-year periods.162 There are a small number
of decisions during the five-year periods prior to 1900; therefore,
we focus mainly on two trends in the data relating to the twentieth
century.

162
Recall that for the years prior to 1944, all relevant cases were included in the
dataset, whereas, for 1944 and subsequent years, a random sample of the cases was
included in the dataset. The vertical line drawn in Figure 2 divides these periods. For
this reason, the increase in the number of decided cases after 1944 is actually understated in Figure 2.

projected decisions not requiring disclosure

decisions not requiring disclosure

Figure 2: Number of Fraudulent Silence Decisions by Outcome

Virginia Law Review

* This bar includes estimates for May 16, 2002 through the end of 2005.
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Recall that our dataset includes cases decided through May 15,
2002. The striped bars represent projections for the period May 15,
2002, through 2005. The vertical line separates cases decided prior
to 1944, all of which are included in our dataset, from cases decided
during or after 1944, a random sample of which is included in our
dataset.
By examining Figures 1 and 2 simultaneously, we find that, especially in the years subsequent to 1970, the courts become less likely
to require disclosure, while, during the same period, a significantly
increasing number of decisions appear in our dataset. On its face,
this result seems counterintuitive. One might predict that, as the
probability of winning at trial decreases, fewer uninformed parties
will bring claims and more will settle prior to resolution by the
court.163
To explain this seemingly odd result, one would need information on filing behavior, settlement rates, whether statutes impact
the types of cases decided under common law, whether the issues
on which judges choose to write opinions change over time, and
how disclosure rules affect individual decisions about whether to
disclose information. Accordingly, any conjectures made here
about what is driving these patterns are simply that—conjectures.
Nonetheless, one possibility is worth mentioning. Recall that the
existence of a duty to disclose is only one element of a fraudulent
silence case in which the plaintiff must prove other elements, such
as scienter, reliance, and materiality, in order to prevail. If the increase in the number of fraudulent silence decisions actually reflects an increase in the number of such claims that are brought
and survive to litigation at the same time that the plaintiff’s probability of winning on the duty to disclose element is decreasing,
then this could possibly reflect the fact that the plaintiff’s probability of winning on one or more of the other elements of a fraudulent
silence case (materiality, for example) is increasing at an even
faster rate. Naturally, we are unable to test this conjecture using
our data. Our study, however, raises the possibility that a similar

163

We recognize the possibility that fewer cases are being filed and more cases make
it to the decision stage as time goes on. Our data, however, do not allow us to investigate the relationship between the probability of the court imposing a duty to disclose
on the informed party and the number of cases decided per year.

2ND SUB_KRAWIECZEILERBOOK.DOC

1872

11/17/2005 10:32:28 AM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 91:1795

study focusing on one or more of the other elements of a fraudulent silence case would reveal interesting time trends as well.
4. The time trend on the number of fraudulent silence decisions is in
marked contrast to time trends on the number of decisions in
contract cases generally.
In a 2001 study of contract litigation, Professor Marc Galanter
found that the volume of trials in contract cases increased until
1990, followed by a substantial decline by about one-third, culminating in a period of little change from year to year.164 Our data on
fraudulent silence decisions follow a markedly different pattern.
Rather than decreasing during the period after 1990, Figure 2 indicates that fraudulent silence decisions, although fluctuating somewhat, generally increased after 1990.
Of course, several variables affect the number of decisions in
contract cases, including decisions by informed parties regarding
whether to disclose information during the contracting process, filing behavior, settlement behavior, and statutory developments.
Because we lack information relating to those factors, we do not
theorize about why fraudulent silence decisions do not follow general trends of contract cases. Once again, however, these findings
point to areas of potential research for those interested in patterns
in contract and tort litigation.
5. The data do not support specific claims made by commentators
about trends over time.
Some commentators make more specific claims about trends
over time relating to the probability that courts will require the disclosure of material information. For example, recall from Part I
that Professor Horwitz claims that, as the United States transitioned from an agrarian to a commercial economy, courts became
more likely to require the disclosure of information not available
to both parties.165 To test this claim, we ran a logistic regression

164
Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or May Not
Want to Know About Contract Litigation, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 577, 598 (2001) (reporting, for example, that 2507 contract trials were held in federal district court in 1988
while 1517 trials were held in 1992, 1081 in 1996, and 902 in 1999).
165
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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controlling for the twenty case characteristics, the year the case was
decided, and an interaction term (ACCESS * YEAR), to pick up
the trend over time in cases involving unequal access. The coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant (p = 0.72), indicating
no significant trend over time exists. Our data thus do not support
Horwitz’s claim regarding changes in this area of the law due to
changes in the economy.
In addition, in a paper published in 1978, Professor Kronman
claimed that disclosure duties relating to latent defects increased
dramatically during the twenty-five-year period between approximately 1953 and 1978.166 To test this claim, we attempted to employ
a logistic regression using the twenty variables related to case characteristics. This regression failed to produce results because many
of the variables are perfect predictors of disclosure and several of
the variables are collinear. Therefore, we employed simple tabulations to test the claim. We found that, prior to 1953, courts found a
duty to disclose in 15 of the 16 cases (or 94%) involving latent defects. In the twenty-five-year period between 1953 and 1978, 9
cases involved latent defects and, of those 9 cases, the court found
a duty to disclose in 8 (or 89%). A test for the equality of proportions finds no statistically significant difference between the percentages (p = 0.65). Therefore, our data do not support Kronman’s
claim about the development of the law relating to latent defects.
G. Court
1. Courts located in the Mid-Atlantic states and the Southwest are
more likely to require disclosure than are courts located in other
geographic regions. In addition, in contrast to the statements of some
commentators, courts located in the South are not more likely to
require disclosure, either during the period over which our data span
or historically.
We coded the cases for the geographic region in which the court
sits to determine whether any geographic patterns emerged with
respect to case outcomes.167 The basic regression results presented

166

Kronman, supra note 1, at 23–24.
States were assigned to geographic regions using the classification employed by
the U.S. Embassy. See U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Germany, The Regions of the
167
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in Table 6 indicate that courts located in the South, West, and
Northeast are no more likely to impose liability for fraudulent silence than are courts located in other regions.168 The results, however, do indicate that courts located in the Mid-Atlantic states and
the Southwest are more likely to require disclosure than are courts
located in other regions.
As discussed in Part I, some commentators claim that southern
states historically were much less likely to impose disclosure duties
on bargaining parties than were states in other regions.169 To test
this claim, we employed two strategies. First, we ran a logistic regression controlling for the twenty case characteristics, the year the
case was decided, and geographic regions (represented by
SOUTH, WEST, MIDATLANTIC, SOUTHWEST, and
NEWENGLAND with MIDWEST as the base) to test for regional
differences over particular periods. The first regression, using data
only from cases decided between 1793 and 1860, failed because
several independent variables were perfect predictors of the likelihood that the court would mandate disclosure.170 The second regression used data only from cases decided between 1861 and 1940.
The coefficient on the variable SOUTH is insignificant (p = 0.94),
indicating no significant difference between cases decided in the
South and other regions during this period of time. For the sake of
completeness, we ran the same regression using only cases decided
between 1941 and 2002. Again, the coefficient on SOUTH was not
statistically significant (p = 0.92).
Our second strategy involved calculating the proportion of cases
in each region that imposed liability for two early periods: 1793–
1860 and 1860–1940. We also performed similar calculations for
the period 1941–2002 for purposes of comparison. The tabulations

United States, http://usa.usembassy.de/travel-regions.htm (last accessed Sept. 17,
2005).
168
We used the variable MIDWEST as the base to run the regressions. When we include MIDWEST in the model and use another region as the base, we find that the
coefficient on MIDWEST is not significantly different from zero. Therefore, courts in
the Midwest are no more or less likely to impose liability for fraudulent silence than
courts in other regions.
169
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
170
For example, in all cases involving personal intentions (PERSONAL) the court
imposed a duty to disclose. The same was true for LATENT, INSURE, CONFID,
ACCESS, PROPERTY, LIED, and INTRINSIC.
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by outcome and by region for these three periods are presented in
Table 8.
Table 8
Tabulations for Decisions by Outcome and by Region
1793–1860
SOUTH

WEST

MIDATLANTIC

Disclosure Duty Found

3 (75%)

0

6 (75%)

0

0 (0%)

1 (50%)

Disclosure Duty Not Found

1 (25%)

0

2 (25%)

0

1 (100%)

1 (50%)

SOUTH

WEST

MIDATLANTIC

SOUTHWEST

NEW ENGLAND

MIDWEST

Disclosure Duty Found

19 (61%)

4 (40%)

29 (91%)***

4 (67%)

5 (56%)

28 (74%)

Disclosure Duty Not Found

12 (39%)

6 (60%)

3 (9%)

2 (33%)

4 (44%)

10 (26%)

SOUTH

WEST

MIDATLANTIC

SOUTHWEST

NEW ENGLAND

MIDWEST

Disclosure Duty Found

33 (41%)

34 (61%)**

23 (35%)

14 (47%)

10 (46%)

24 (34%)

Disclosure Duty Not Found

48 (59%)

22 (39%)

43 (65%)

16 (53%)

12 (54%)

46 (66%)

SOUTHWEST

NEW ENGLAND

MIDWEST

1861–1940

1941–2002

* Significantly lower proportion of cases decided in the South as compared to this region, at the
10% significance level (p < 0.10).
** Significantly lower proportion of cases decided in the South as compared to this region, at the
5% significance level (p < 0.05).
*** Significantly lower proportion of cases decided in the South as compared to this region, at
the 1% significance level (p < 0.01).
TABLE 8: This table presents the results of tabulations of the number of decisions by outcome
and by region for three periods: 1793–1860, 1861–1940 and 1941–2002. Two-sample, one-sized
tests for the equality of proportions were performed to compare the proportion of decisions
finding a duty to disclose and decided in the South to the proportion of decisions finding a duty
to disclose and decided in another region. For each test, the null hypothesis of equal proportions
was tested against the alternative hypothesis that the proportion of decisions finding a disclosure
duty and decided in the South is significantly less than the proportion of decisions finding a disclosure duty and decided in another region.

For the period 1793–1860, only fifteen cases are contained in the
total sample, and only four of those were decided in the South. In
three of the four cases, disclosure was required. This proportion is
equal to the proportion of cases decided in the Mid-Atlantic states
in which the court required disclosure. All other regions require
disclosure in a smaller percentage of cases. Although the number
of observations is very small, the data for this period support the
claim that the South was less likely to impose a duty to disclose.
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For the periods 1861–1940 and 1941–2002, tests for the equality
of proportions were performed to compare the proportion of cases
requiring disclosure and decided in the South to the proportion of
cases requiring disclosure and decided in each of the other regions.
Five separate tests (one for each region) were performed for each
period. For each test, the null hypothesis of equal proportions was
tested against an alternative hypothesis that the proportion of cases
requiring disclosure and decided in the South is significantly less
than the proportion of cases requiring disclosure and decided in
the region of comparison.
Only two of the ten tests indicate that the South is significantly
less likely to require disclosure as compared to other geographic
regions. First, during the period 1861–1940, courts in the South
were less likely to require disclosure than were courts in the MidAtlantic states. Second, during the period 1941–2002, courts in the
South were less likely to require disclosure than were courts in the
West. Otherwise, no statistically significant difference exists between the proportion of cases decided in the South finding a duty
to disclose and the proportion of similarly decided cases in courts
located in other regions finding a duty to disclose. Therefore, the
data do not provide strong support for the claim that southern
states historically were less likely to require disclosure as compared
to other regions of the country.
2. State courts are no more or less likely than federal courts to
require the informed party to reveal information to the uninformed
party. In addition, the Third Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and Seventh
Circuit are more likely than any other circuit to require disclosure.
As indicated in Part I, we were interested in determining
whether courts differ by jurisdiction in terms of how likely they are
to require disclosure. Specifically, we were interested in whether
any differences existed between federal and state courts, or among
the federal appellate circuits.
The results presented in Table 6 indicate that the coefficient on
STATE is significant and positive (p = 0.04) when we control only
for variables relating to the 20 case characteristics. This provides
some evidence for the claim that state courts are more likely than
federal courts to impose duties to disclose. When we add controls
for the case decision year, geographic regions, and federal appel-
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late circuit, however, the coefficient loses significance. This lack of
robustness suggests that any difference between federal and state
courts on this issue is weak at best. When all independent variables
are included in the model, the coefficient on STATE becomes statistically insignificant (p = 0.28), indicating that state courts are no
more or less likely to require disclosure than are federal courts.
In addition, the results obtained from the regression analysis
(see Table 6) indicate that three federal appellate jurisdictions are
less likely to require disclosure than any other federal appellate jurisdiction: the Third Circuit (p = 0.08), the Sixth Circuit (p = 0.02),
and the Seventh Circuit (p = 0.05). We cannot offer conjectures
about why these particular circuits are less likely to impose a duty
to disclose on informed parties but leave this task for other researchers. One potentially interesting research question that arises
from this finding is whether these results reflect broader trends in
these circuits beyond fraudulent silence cases.
H. A Note on Priest-Klein
Courts found a duty to disclose in approximately 51% of the
cases in the sample. This statistic is consistent with the Priest-Klein
litigation model, which implies that, because only close cases are
likely to proceed to litigation (with clear cases being settled or
never brought at all), “the formal structure of the law [will] appear
indeterminate to any scientific, empirical method of observing judicial decisions.”171 In other words, the model suggests that it is impossible to identify factors that significantly influence outcomes
given that all litigated cases are perched on the knife-edge. In
roughly half of the cases, they theorize, the outcome randomly falls
to one side of the knife; in the other half, it randomly falls to the
other side.
For this reason, under the Priest-Klein model, our analysis is futile: if the model is truly predictive, then our analysis should fail to
discover any significant drivers of outcomes. As this Part has revealed, however, nearly half of our independent variables significantly influence court decisions regarding whether the informed
party had a duty to disclose information to the uninformed party.
Therefore, we are left to explain these seemingly contradictory re171

See Priest & Klein, supra note 104, at 6.
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sults (that is, the finding of statistically significant factors that seem
to drive outcomes (contrary to the Priest-Klein predictions) despite
the fact that the outcomes are nearly evenly divided (consistent
with the Priest-Klein predictions)).
One could claim that our results are simply spurious. Given the
pattern of our results, however, we do not believe this is the case.
For example, the factors found to significantly influence outcomes
do not appear to be random. Instead, we find that many of the factors that significantly increase the probability that a court will impose a duty to disclose are also the most widely-accepted, such as
the factors listed in the Restatement of Contracts (that is, whether
the parties are in a fiduciary or confidential relationship, whether
the information is related to a latent defect, and whether the information would have updated or corrected previously disclosed
information).172
In addition, as a matter of theory, there are reasons to doubt that
the Priest-Klein model holds when studying outcomes on the element of the duty to disclose in fraudulent silence claims. In a
fraudulent silence case, the imposition of a duty to disclose is only
one element of a multi-element cause of action in which the plaintiff must also prove elements such as scienter, reliance, and materiality. As a result, even when the plaintiff can easily show that the
defendant had a duty to disclose, the case nonetheless might proceed to the litigation and opinion stage due to the parties’ uncertainty about another element. As a result, cases in which the element of duty is on the knife-edge are but a subset of the cases in
our sample and, therefore, our regression analysis is able to identify factors that significantly influence outcomes on the duty element.
Given that our analysis focuses on just one element—duty—of a
multi-element cause of action—fraudulent silence—one might
question why we do not observe a larger majority of outcomes on
the duty element favoring the plaintiff.173 It must be remembered,
however, that plaintiffs may sometimes raise claims that they have
a small probability of winning. This is true, for example, of suits in
172

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161 (1979).
One could argue that, if the duty element is not an element that is balanced on
the knife-edge, then it must be an element on which the plaintiff is more likely to win.
Otherwise, one might speculate that rational plaintiffs would not bring the case.
173
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which plaintiffs have one or more relatively strong claims, but can
allege other, weaker, claims based on the same fact pattern. Under
such circumstances, the marginal cost of adding an additional weak
claim to the suit is essentially zero.174 Under these circumstances,
the plaintiffs’ success rate on the duty element could be less than
50%. For these reasons, the fact that we observe 50% of the outcomes on the duty element favoring the plaintiff might very well be
anomalous and unrelated to the predictions of the Priest-Klein
model.
CONCLUSION
The question of when an individual in possession of valuable information unknown to her contracting partner has the right to remain silent and profit from her secret knowledge has fascinated
scholars in philosophy, law, and history since ancient times. Many
have developed specific and general “meta-theories” to explain the
variation in case outcomes. Few, however, have attempted to systematically analyze the cases, and none has employed regression
analysis to isolate the effects of particular factors on case outcomes.
Our analysis calls into question much of the conventional wisdom regarding the law of fraudulent silence. In fact, our results fail
to support several of the most prominent theories that have been
asserted to explain when courts will require full disclosure between
contracting parties. Specifically, our data do not support the contentions that courts more frequently require the disclosure of intrinsic information than extrinsic information; that courts insist on
the disclosure of information that could prevent bodily injury or
property damage; that informed parties are able to freely withhold
information regarding personal intentions or opinions; that those
seeking insurance, surety, or a release from liability must disclose
all relevant information; that courts more frequently require disclosure in transactions relating to the sale or transfer of real prop174

For example, consider cases in which the plaintiff’s strongest claim is that the defendant affirmatively misrepresented a material fact. In cases such as these, the plaintiff might find that the marginal cost of adding even a weak claim to the suit alleging
affirmative misrepresentation is essentially zero. In other words, if the facts giving rise
to an affirmative misrepresentation claim also give rise to an albeit weak fraudulent
silence claim, then the plaintiff might tack on the weak fraudulent silence claim.
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erty; that courts tend not to require the disclosure of deliberately
acquired information; that courts have become more likely to require disclosure over time; or that southern states are less likely to
require disclosure than are states in other regions of the country.
In some cases, however, the data do support conventional wisdom. In particular, the data support the hypotheses that courts are
more likely to require the disclosure of latent, as opposed to patent, defects; that courts are more likely to require the disclosure of
information that would update or correct previously disclosed information; that courts are more likely to require full disclosure between parties in a fiduciary or confidential relationship; that courts
are more likely to require the disclosure of illegally or tortiously
acquired information; and that courts are more likely to require
disclosure when the uninformed party is a buyer or lessee.
In addition, our own intuition that courts are swayed by the
sympathetic nature of the uninformed party and the bad behavior
of the informed party are supported by the data. Courts are significantly more likely to require disclosure when the uninformed party
is sick, disabled, illiterate, or elderly, though still competent to contract. Also, courts are more likely to require disclosure when the
informed party lied or told half-truths in the same transaction in
which the omission occurred, or when the informed party took affirmative steps to conceal the withheld information. Our suspicion,
however, that courts are more likely to require disclosure when the
uninformed party is female is not supported by the data, although
our data did reveal a time trend in fraudulent silence decisions
when the uninformed party is female. The percentage of cases in
which the uninformed party is female and the court required disclosure decreased significantly from the period 1793–1950 to the
period 1951–2002.
Perhaps most importantly, our analysis suggests that the longstanding and heated debate between those who argue that courts
attempt primarily to enhance fairness by placing contracting parties on a more even playing field and those who argue that courts
attempt primarily to enhance economic efficiency by allowing informed parties to reap the benefit of knowledge that is deliberately
acquired could be misplaced. Our data provide little, if any, support for the contention that courts are more likely to require the
disclosure of casually, as compared to deliberately, acquired infor-
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mation. Regression results do indicate that courts are more likely
to require the disclosure of information when the parties lack equal
access. Our analysis, however, reveals that it is the presence of unequal access in combination with casually acquired information
that drives case outcomes. Therefore, it is the presence of these
two factors together, rather than either one independently, that
significantly affects case outcomes.
We view this study merely as a first step toward unraveling a difficult and controversial area of law, rather than a definitive answer
to the question of what drives outcomes in fraudulent silence cases.
Although this study provides some answers, it raises many questions as well.
For example, although our data show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, courts have become less likely over time to require
the disclosure of material information unknown to one’s bargaining partner, does this mean that courts have become more prodefendant over time? Or have other factors, such as the codification of certain areas of fraudulent silence law through statutes that
mandate particular disclosures, altered the type of case that survives to litigation under the common law?175 The answers to these
questions, and others, however, are beyond the scope of this Article.
In addition, regression analyses on data spanning a twohundred-year period do not permit us to capture the law at any
particular point in time. Alternative strategies (such as, for example, using regression analysis over moving windows of smaller time
periods) allow such an analysis, however. Not only would this
strategy more fully highlight any time trends in the data, but also it
would permit testing for whether particular events or developments of note, such as, for example, the publication of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, actually produced changes in the

175
Common examples are statutes mandating certain disclosures in residential real
estate transactions and car sales. Because such statutes are generally pro-plaintiff, if
these statutes merely codify changes that were already occurring under the common
law, then the cases remaining to be decided under the common law could conceivably
be those in areas of the law in which courts were not expanding disclosure duties. As a
result, these cases would appear to reflect a pro-defendant trend that does not really
exist.
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law (as has been asserted by some commentators), rather than
simply restated the law.176

176
G. Edward White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of Modernist
Jurisprudence, 15 Law & Hist. Rev. 1, 46 (1997) (discussing the debate over whether
the ALI only restates the law or attempts to revise it); Herbert P. Wilkins, Foreword
to the Symposium on the American Law Institute: Process, Partisanship, and the Restatements of Law, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 567, 569 (1998) (stating that some argue that
the ALI often attempts to push the law in a particular direction, as opposed to simply
restating the law).
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APPENDIX A
This appendix describes the data collection process undertaken
for Common-Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories. The purpose of this appendix is to provide
details regarding the population of cases from which we drew our
sample and our case coding procedures.
1. The Population of Cases From Which We Drew Our Sample
The Allcases-old database includes documents from the United
States Supreme Court, courts of appeals, district courts, former circuit courts, former Court of Claims, “related federal courts” (such
as the tax and customs courts), and state and local courts.1 The federal documents included in the database are those opinions “released for publication” between 1789 and 1944. State and local
coverage begins on various dates and extends through 1944.2
It is unclear from West’s website whether “released for publication” refers only to documents officially released for publication or
whether it also includes unpublished opinions that might have become available. Neither West’s reference attorneys nor any other
company representative was able to clarify this point.3 Because the
practice (at least within the federal appellate courts) of disposing
of cases through unpublished opinions is assumed by most commentators to have begun in 1964, however, the issue of unpublished opinions is likely a greater problem in the Allcases database
than in the Allcases-old database.4
The Allcases database includes decisions dated after 1944 from
the United States Supreme Court, courts of appeals, district courts,
bankruptcy courts, the Court of Federal Claims, the United States
Tax Court, the Military Courts, and the state and local courts of all
1
Westlaw, Westlaw Database Directory, http://directory.westlaw.com/scope/
default.asp?db=ALLCASES-OLD&RS=WDIR2.0&VR=2.0 (last accessed Sept. 17,
2005).
2
Id.
3
Telephone Interview with Reference Attorney, West, in Eagan, Minn. (Aug. 4,
2002).
4
See infra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the origination of the federal
appellate non-publication and no-citation policies).
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the states and the District of Columbia.5 The Allcases database includes published as well as some unpublished opinions.6
Like many other studies attempting to empirically examine case
law or judicial developments, this study is limited to the Westlaw
database, which does not include all decided cases. Instead, Westlaw excludes some unpublished cases, thus biasing the results to the
extent that there is some systematic difference between available
and unavailable cases.
According to a Westlaw representative, West gathers unpublished opinions for inclusion in the Allcases database from three
sources: (1) the Federal Appendix, a West publication; (2) opinions
submitted to Westlaw for posting in the database directly by the
deciding court; and (3) opinions submitted to Westlaw by attorneys.7 The Federal Appendix does not contain all unpublished opinions. Specifically, the Third, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits do not
permit publication of their unpublished opinions in the Appendix.8
In addition, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits do not release their
unpublished opinions for inclusion in the Westlaw or Lexis databases.9
Finally, West does not include in the Allcases database all unpublished opinions submitted for inclusion by attorneys. Instead,
West reviews the submitted cases and selects “some” for inclusion.
No Westlaw representative was able to provide further information
on the selection process, what criteria were used to determine inclusion, or indicate what percentage of cases submitted for inclusion by attorneys was ultimately included in the database.10
5
Westlaw, Westlaw Database Directory, http://directory.westlaw.com/scope/
default.asp?db=ALLCASES&RS=WDIR2.0&VR=2.0 (last visited Sept. 17, 2005).
6
Id. An “unpublished” opinion is one which the court has determined should be excluded from the official reporter, ostensibly because the case contains no precedential
value. Cf. Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie L. Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules
Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 251 (2001)
(outlining the guidelines for opinion publication and citation in each federal and state
court of appeal).
7
Telephone Interview with Reference Attorney, West, in Eagan, Minn. (Aug. 4,
2002).
8
Brian P. Brooks, Publishing Unpublished Opinions, 5 Green Bag 259, 260 (2002).
9
See David Greenwald & Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1133, 1150 n.64 (2002).
10
Telephone Interview with Reference Attorney, West, in Eagan, Minn. (Aug. 4,
2002).

KRAWIECZEILERAPPENDIXBOOK

2005]

Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission

11/16/2005 5:34 PM

1885

West’s failure to include all decided cases in the on-line database
could significantly impact our results. Specifically, the unpublished
federal appellate decisions seem more likely to be included on
Lexis and Westlaw than are unpublished state court decisions. For
this reason, if there is some systematic difference between federal
appellate court decisions and state court decisions, this differential
inclusion in the Westlaw database could affect the results of this or
any other study relying on the Westlaw database. Similarly, because the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits do not release their unpublished opinions for inclusion on Westlaw or Lexis, if there is some
systematic difference between the Fifth and Eleventh circuits on
the one hand, and the other eleven circuits on the other hand, this
difference might bias the results of this and any other study that
employs the Westlaw database.
Given that, in the federal appeals courts alone, over eighty percent of the caseload is disposed of through unpublished opinions,
this is a potentially glaring omission.11 Although federal unpublished opinions have no precedential value in most jurisdictions,12
many commentators argue that unpublished opinions, nonetheless,
are important.13 Accordingly, readers should at least be aware of
the potential limits of this or any other study based on the on-line
databases.14

11
2001 Admin. Off. of the U.S. Courts Ann. Rep. of the Director Table S–3, at 40,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2001/tables/s03sep01.pdf.
12
Currently, only the Fourth, Sixth and D.C. Circuits permit the citation of unpublished opinions as precedent. See 4th Cir. R. 36(c) (laying out the 4th Circuit’s rule);
6th Cir. R. 28(g) (laying out the 6th Circuit’s rule); D.C. Cir. R. 28(c) (laying out the
DC Circuit’s rule). The rules regarding the precedential value of unpublished opinions are contained in the court rules for each circuit. For a discussion of the rules, see
Jason B. Binimow, Annotation, Precedential Effect of Unpublished Opinions, 105
A.L.R.5th 499 (2005); David Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on
the Debate Over Unpublished Opinions, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. (forthcoming Fall
2006).
13
See, e.g., Suzanne O. Snowden, “That’s My Holding and I’m Not Sticking to It!”
Court Rules That Deprive Unpublished Opinions of Precedential Authority Distort
the Common Law, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 1253, 1257 (2001) (arguing that unpublished
opinions often would have had important future precedential value if they had been
published).
14
For a general discussion on the limitations of empirical studies of case outcomes,
see Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1036, 1045–47 (1991).
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Although the problem of officially unpublished cases does not
likely affect the Allcases-old database—the practice is generally assumed to have begun with the 1964 Federal Judicial Conference15—
surveys of older American case law suffer from an even greater
problem: the lack of case reporting during the early years of
American independence. In the early years of the history of the
American courts, lack of reporting of decided cases was a serious
problem.16 Lawyers had to make do with reports of English cases,
which were still widely used even after American independence,
and notebooks of decisions that lawyers maintained for their own
use and use by their colleagues and friends.17
Even opinions of the United States Supreme Court were difficult
to obtain in the early years. The Court often failed to reduce even
its most important decisions to writing;18 the reporters did not include all decisions in their reports, perhaps excluding, in some
cases, as many as half;19 reports were often unavailable for periods
of up to eight years after the end of the Supreme Court term;20 and
the reports of some reporters, at least, were heavily criticized, even
by their contemporaries and the justices themselves, as being inac-

15
See, e.g., Greenwald & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1141; Deborah Jones Merritt &
James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United
States Courts of Appeals, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 71, 75–76 (2001).
16
See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) iii–v (1804) (“Much of that uncertainty of the law, which is
so frequently, and perhaps so justly, the subject of complaint in this country, may be
attributed to the want of American reports.”), quoted in Craig Joyce, The Rise of the
Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1291, 1308 (1985) (discussing the problem of nonreporting of
cases in the early years of the American court system).
17
Id. at 1297; see also Erwin C. Surrency, Law Reports in the United States, 25 Am.
J. Legal Hist. 48, 49 (1981) (discussing the prevalence of English law reports in eighteenth-century estates).
18
Joyce, supra note 16, at 1298 n.46, 1304 n.77 (quoting a telephone conversation
with Maeva Marcus, Coeditor of the Documentary History Project, where she states,
“It seems odd that if opinions were written, not a single one in the hand of a justice
survives. So it is likely that few, if any, ever existed.”).
19
Id. at 1303 (discussing the incompleteness of the reports of Alexander James Dallas, the Court’s first—though unofficial—reporter); id at 1329–30 (discussing the
omission of cases by Henry Wheaton, the Court’s third—and first official—reporter).
20
Id. at 1327–28 (noting that Dallas and William Cranch, the Court’s second—
though unofficial—reporter, had allowed Supreme Court cases to go unreported for
eight and six years, respectively). These delays were corrected by Wheaton, who generally published the reports of the prior term in time for the start of the next. Id.
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curate.21 One can only assume that reports of state and lower federal cases suffered from similar problems.
Readers thus should bear in mind that our only historical record
of early court decisions might be substantially inaccurate. Again,
this is an unavoidable failing of all studies of early case law, and we
do not feel that it renders our results any less important or robust.
2. Case-Coding Procedures
Case coding was done by research assistants, with the supervision of one of the authors. Weekly meetings were held as a group
in order to assess progress, discuss the cases, and answer questions.
Steps were taken to enhance the consistency of coding by the different research assistants. These steps include the adoption of
bright-line rules, where possible, and several weeks of individually
coding the same set of cases and discussing them as a group. Once
the group was able to consistently reach the same coding results,
coding on the project began. In addition, once the initial case coding was complete, all of the coding was double-checked by a research assistant who had not been involved in the initial coding
project. The reliability test resulted in a match of roughly 90% of
the data coded by the original coders.
Not all cases retrieved by the search terms were includable in the
study. For example, a small percentage of cases contained all of the
specified search terms, yet did not address the question being studied. In addition, we were unable to code some cases, either because
the court did not reach a decision on the merits of the case, or because the opinion did not contain sufficient information to allow
for complete coding of all the independent variables. When the
case included in our sample was an appeal from a lower court decision and that lower decision was available on Westlaw, the research assistants sometimes referred to the lower court decision to
21

Id. at 1304–05 (discussing the inaccuracy of Dallas’s reports), 1309–10 (discussing
inaccuracies in the reports of Cranch), 1361 (discussing criticisms of the reports of
Richard Peters, Jr., the Court’s fourth reporter). The problem of inaccuracy probably
stemmed from many causes, including commercial considerations and the fact that
some reporters (notably, Dallas) included reports of cases of which they did not have
first-hand knowledge, but instead which were reconstructed from the notes of attorneys in attendance. Id. at 1305. One exception to these criticisms of inaccuracy appears to be Wheaton, who reportedly was “fanatical” on this point. Id. at 1329–30.

KRAWIECZEILERAPPENDIXBOOK

1888

11/16/2005 5:34 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 91:1795

ascertain the complete facts necessary to code the case. In rare
cases, a court did not reach a decision on the merits of the case, but
nonetheless clearly indicated how it would have ruled if forced to
decide the case. Such cases were included in our dataset, despite
the lack of a formal resolution to the dispute.
Cases in which the common law had been altered due to a
waiver, warranty, or statute were excluded from the dataset. For
example, a waiver might alter the common law by waiving the uninformed party’s rights to sue for nondisclosure under common
law. This would include items sold “as is.” Similarly, a warranty
might enhance the uninformed party’s status under the common
law by guaranteeing the value or suitability of the item in question.
Finally, the research assistants checked all the cases in our dataset for negative direct history. If a lower court’s fraudulent silence
decision was reversed and remanded specifically on the element of
the existence of a duty to disclose, then the lower court case was
excluded from our dataset. The appellate decision also was excluded unless the appellate court reached a decision on the merits
of the duty element. If, however, a lower court case was overturned
for procedural reasons or on a point of law unrelated to the duty to
disclose issue, then the lower court case was included in our dataset, despite the fact that the holding technically no longer stands.

